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Domestic violence is a subject about which judges need good initialeducation and continuing refresher courses.  Quite simply, there ismuch about it that is counterintuitive.  Why does a woman who is
physically and mentally abused day after day, week after week, stay with the
abuser?   For most of us, the answer is neither self-evident nor a part of our
personal life experience.  Yet there is a large—and growing—body of good
research in the area.
Julie Kunce Field, a member of Court Review’s editorial board who special-
izes in the area of law and domestic violence, has recruited some leading
experts to contribute to this special issue, cov-
ering issues of special interest to judges:  Field
provides a useful overview of the area, includ-
ing strategies for identifying high-risk cases
and some tips for handling those cases.  Lundy
Bancroft covers issues involving the parenting
of men who commit domestic abuse.  Lavita
Nadkarni and Barbara Zeek Shaw focus on the
judicial role in protecting children involved in
families where abuse has occurred.  Darren
Mitchell and Judge Susan Carbon explain the
often-confusing state and federal laws regard-
ing possession and purchase of firearms by perpetrators of domestic violence.
And Jane Aiken and Jane Murphy review evidence issues prevalent in domes-
tic violence cases.  
In addition to these articles, we have a Resource Page section focusing on
domestic violence cases, including a list of past Court Review articles available
on the web and other web-based resources.
______________
Summer 2002?  Yes, sadly it’s not a misprint.  This is the Summer 2002
issue of Court Review.  And though it hasn’t actually been all that long since
you received your last issue, we have gradually fallen behind in our publica-
tion schedule.
The good news is that we are committed to getting caught back up in a
measured way over the next year.  You can expect to receive issues during the
rest of 2003 on an accelerated schedule.  I expect that you will actually
receive five issues, instead of four, during 2003.  We remain committed to
making sure that there is useful information for judges in each issue.  We
appreciate your continued readership. —SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
43 of this issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit,
condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit:  cover photo, Mary Watkins. The cover
photo is of the Old Courthouse in Mt. Holly, New Jersey.  
© 2003, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
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scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
P.O. Box 8798, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798.
Points of view or opinions expressed in Court Review are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
positions of the National Center for State Courts or the
American Judges Association.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
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I have chosen for my initial column a topic that is of impor-
tance to all judges, regardless of jurisdiction or locality, yet is
often ignored—courtroom and personal security. Given the
domestic violence theme of this issue and the special security
concerns involving courtrooms that conduct hearings involv-
ing domestic violence and family matters, I thought that this
subject matter was most appropriate.   I have been interested in
courtroom security for many years, due to my law enforcement
background, having served as a police officer in Washington,
D.C., and in New Jersey. Given the limited space I have for this
column, I can only touch briefly upon this topic. It is my hope
that by revisiting this subject, each of us becomes more vigilant
and sensitized to issues involving both personal
and courtroom security. 
From a global perspective, since the tragic
events of 9-11, all of us have seen heightened secu-
rity measures in effect in both our private and pro-
fessional lives. In addition to courthouses, most
public facilities have taken added security measures
to insure the safety of the general public. Most of
us, subsequent to the incidents at the World Trade
Center, have spent considerably longer periods of
time waiting to be screened by those in charge of airport secu-
rity. The presence of additional police, National Guard, and
other security forces is most evident. 
While serving as an assistant county prosecutor in northern
New Jersey, a tragedy occurred in a municipal court that
impressed upon me the need for heightened security. We were
required to attend probable cause hearings in municipal courts
that involved alleged felony offenses. A disgruntled defendant,
who appeared before the court and was convicted of a traffic
violation, left the courtroom, only to reappear outside, unde-
tected, with a weapon. The defendant positioned himself out-
side of the municipal complex, which housed the courtroom,
and fired a rifle shot, mortally wounding the judge, who was
conducting court. Unfortunately, this was made possible due to
the manner in which the building was constructed. The court-
room was located on the second floor, with the judge’s bench
being positioned behind a window and visible from the street
level. This occurred many years ago and, fortunately, most
court facilities are now constructed in such a fashion that this
type of event could not occur today.
Each of us should be aware of the safety and security fea-
tures that are to be integrated into court facilities during con-
struction and renovations. As most judges have no expertise in
this area, other professionals should be consulted to provide
input before any construction or renovation begins. Once the
plans are drawn and construction begins, design changes are
both difficult and costly. An architect should be chosen who is
familiar with the special security needs of court facilities. Your
local trial court administrator’s office can usually provide
insight and guidance regarding construction and renovation of
court facilities.
Access and entrances to both the courthouse and court-
rooms should be carefully guarded. Video cameras should be
strategically placed in order to monitor both inside and outside
of all court facilities, including parking areas. The number of
entrances should be limited, given the problems presented by
multiple entrances. A sign should be prominently posted,
advising that all who enter the courtroom are subject to search.
The mere posting of this notice may in and of itself
serve as a deterrent to those having weapons.
Officers should use a metal detector at each
entrance and search all those entering the room.
Bags, packages, knapsacks, computers, and brief-
cases must be closely scrutinized. A list of prohib-
ited items that cannot be taken into the courtroom,
including electronic devices, should also be promi-
nently displayed.  Those entering the courtroom
should be advised to remain seated during the ses-
sion, as it is then easier to monitor those individuals. Officers
should be positioned between the bench and those in the room
and remain present at all times, including recesses. Witness
stands should be constructed so as to deny the witness direct
access to the judge. There should be no public access to the
judge’s chambers. Once in the building, the judge should not
use public corridors without being escorted by security per-
sonnel. 
Each judge’s bench should be lined with a protective shield
and be equipped with an alarm that can alert law enforcement
personnel outside of the courtroom in the event of an emer-
gency. All security personnel should be aware of contingency
plans in case of an emergency.
Judges and their staffs should have secured, well-lit parking
places, close to the court complex, that are not accessible to the
public. Some judges and their staffs may wish to be escorted to
their cars at the conclusion of the working day, especially if
secured parking is not available. 
Judges should not receive mail that identifies them as a
judge at their home. When contacting contractors to do work
within the home or ordering “take out” foods for consumption
within the house, the judicial title should be avoided. All
household members should have immediate access to police
telephone numbers in the event of an emergency. The taking of
these simple precautions may prevent a serious incident or
tragedy. Stay alert and remain vigilant!
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President’s Column
Francis X. Halligan, Jr.
WHAT THE FACT-FINDER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
To make good decisions in domestic relations cases, the fact-
finder must know:
A. What is domestic violence, and who are the most common
victims of domestic violence?
B. What are the risks and consequences of not knowing
whether there is domestic violence in a relationship?
C. Do all system players understand domestic violence?
D. What are the tools available to find out whether there is
domestic violence in a relationship?
E. What can be done once the fact-finder knows that domestic
violence is present in a case?
A. WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WHO ARE THE
MOST COMMON VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
Domestic violence is a pattern of assault and coercion, often
including physical, sexual, and psychological attacks, as well as
economic coercion, that adults and adolescents use against
their intimate partners.6 The key factor characterizing domes-
tic abuse is one partner’s need to control the other.
The most recent, reliable, and comprehensive studies of vio-
lence find that:
• Women are more likely than men to be victimized by inti-
mate partners; women are harmed more severely in those
assaults; and males who are victims of assault are generally
assaulted by other males.7
Domestic abuse is common. It includes emotional andpsychological abuse as well as physical assaults.1Children are harmed by it, even if they are not the direct
victims of the physical violence.2
Because domestic abuse is so prevalent and its effects are so
far-reaching, court personnel must educate themselves to
understand domestic violence and determine strategies for
handling cases where it is present. Even if domestic violence is
present but does not seem to have a direct impact on the case
at hand, one should be aware of the power and control dynam-
ics of domestic abuse to provide effective intervention in
domestic violence cases.   
Screening for domestic violence is important because it can
provide information that can help courts make better decisions
about the cases before them.  Domestic violence is a critical fact
in determining the process and the outcome in a domestic rela-
tions case.  Without an understanding of domestic violence in
general and knowledge about whether there is domestic vio-
lence in a particular case, the decision maker could erroneously
be making orders that (1) increase danger to the victim and
children, including the danger of lethality,3 and (2) reduce the
resources available to the victim, thus increasing the likelihood
that the violence and abuse will continue.4 Before the 
court orders mediation or other alternative processes, it should
look into screening for domestic violence to ensure that the
process of mediation can be effective, and not coercive or revic-
timizing.5
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Footnotes 
1. See FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND &  NATIONAL JUDICIAL
INSTITUTE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ENHANCING JUDICIAL SKILLS IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 3-12–3-15 (2001) (for more informa-
tion on this program, see http://www.endabuse.org/programs/jus-
tice); PETER JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2002); LUNDY
BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT? INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY
AND CONTROLLING MEN 8 (2002).
2. See LUNDY BANCROFT AND JAY SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT:
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY
DYNAMICS (2002).
3. The most dangerous time for a victim is when she attempts to
leave the relationship. See, e.g., Barbara J. Hart, The Legal Road to
Freedom (1991) available at: http://www.mincava.umn.edu/hart/
legalro.htm; Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issues of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991);
Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and
Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 10 (1993).
4. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, supra note 1. 
Screening for Domestic Violence:
Meeting the Challenge of Identifying Domestic Relations
Cases Involving Domestic Violence and Developing 
Strategies for Those Cases
Julie Kunce Field
5. Mediation can be a dangerous setting and can lead to extreme dis-
advantages for less powerful women, particularly when they are
victims of domestic violence. See Penelope Bryan, Killing Us
Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV.
441 (1992).  See also The Impact of Domestic Violence on Your Legal
Practice: A Lawyer’s Handbook 4-17 (Goelman et al., eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Lawyer’s Handbook].
6. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
FAMILY VIOLENCE DEPT., EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE & CHILD MALTREATMENT CASES: GUIDELINES FOR POLICY
AND PRACTICE 9 (1999).
7. See P. Tjaden and N. Thoennes, Full Report of the Prevalence,
Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE AND THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (1998) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.
According to National Crime Victimization Survey data from the
Department of Justice, about 1 million violent crimes in 1998 (a
conservative estimate) were committed against people by their
current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends. These crimes
were committed primarily against women. About 85% of victim-
Summer 2002 - Court Review 5
• More than 50% of abusers will be abusive of their partners
in a subsequent relationship.8
• Nearly 100% of children in violent homes hear or see the
abuse.9
• False allegations of domestic violence occur infrequently,
and there is in fact a significant underreporting of domestic
violence.10
• Consequently, the great majority of cases where there is
domestic violence will have female victims and male perpe-
trators.
The Family Violence Prevention Fund has identified five
central characteristics of domestic violence:11
1. Domestic violence is learned behavior.
2. Domestic violence typically involves repetitive behavior
encompassing different types of abuse.
3. The batterer—not substance abuse, the battered woman, or
the relationship—causes domestic violence.
4. Danger to the battered woman and children is likely to
increase at the time of separation.
5. The victim’s behavior is often a way of ensuring survival.
1. Domestic violence is learned behavior.
Domestic violence perpetrators use domestic violence
because it works: it serves to maintain power over the battered
woman and to cause her to do what the batterer wants.
Domestic violence is learned behavior that batterers perfect
through observation, experience, reinforcement, culture, fam-
ily, and community.12 The batterer learns what works, and
what doesn’t, to cause his victim to do his will.  Domestic vio-
lence perpetrators universally use the same tactics to maintain
control over their victims.  Those tactics are similar to the tac-
tics used by terrorists.13
2. Domestic violence typically involves repetitive
behavior encompassing different types of abuse.
“Battering is the pattern of intimidation, coercion, terrorism
or violence, the sum of all past acts of violence and the
promises of future violence that achieves enhanced power and
control for the [batterer] over [the] partner.”14
The key factor characterizing domestic abuse is one partner’s
need to control the other.  The methods of control include using
economic abuse, isolation, intimidation, emotional abuse, and
sexual abuse.  Children become pawns that the abuser may use
to continue his control over his partner’s actions.15 Each
method of control may be enforced—and reinforced—with the
use or threat of physical violence.16
3. The batterer—not substance abuse, the battered
woman, or the relationship—causes domestic 
violence.
Rarely do substance abuse, genetics, stress, illness, or prob-
lems in the relationship cause domestic violence, though these
conditions are often used as excuses for the violence, and they
may exacerbate violent behavior.17
Batterers who blame drugs or alcohol for their violence gen-
erally are selective in their violence, thus demonstrating that
the violence is controlled, not out of control.  Their violence is
directed against their partner, generally when there are no other
witnesses (perhaps except for the children), and not against
everyone who crosses his path.18
Domestic violence is a problem with the batterer, and caused
by the batterer.  It is not a problem with the relationship or with
the battered woman, but with the batterer’s belief that violence
against his partner is acceptable and appropriate.  Accepting his
excuses—that he was drunk or high, or that she somehow
“made” him hit her—reinforces his violence and control and
does not help to protect the battered woman and her children.
4. Danger to the battered woman and children is
likely to increase at the time of separation.
Many batterers believe they have the right to make and enforce
rules, and many battered women routinely evaluate the rules and
decide which rules they will follow depending on a variety of fac-
tors, such as the dangers presented, the available interventions,
and the likelihood of punishment of the perpetrator.19 
izations by intimate partners in 1998, or 876,340, were against
women. Intimate partner violence made up 22% of violent crime
against women between 1993 and 1998. By contrast, during this
period intimate partners committed 3% of the violence against
men. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT, INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE, MAY 2000 [hereinafter “BJS Report”].
8. See Daniel Saunders, Child Custody Decisions in Families
Experiencing Woman Abuse, 39 SOCIAL WORK 51 (Jan. 1994).
9. See id.
10. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 10
(1996); Jaffe et al., supra note 1 at 58-59.
11. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, supra note 1.
12. See Bancroft and Silverman, supra note 2, at ch. 1.  See also,
JEFFREY EDLESON AND RICHARD TOLMAN, INTERVENTION FOR MEN
WHO BATTER: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 15-25 (1992).
13. See Julie Kunce Field, Lessons from Ground Zero, 7 DOM. VIOL.
REPT. 17 (Dec./Jan. 2002).
14. MICHIGAN JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE TO
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS Ch. 1 (2d ed. 2001); LARRY TIFFT,
BATTERING OF WOMEN: THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION AND THE CASE
FOR PREVENTION 19 (1993).  See also Lavita Nadkarni and Barbara
Zeek Shaw,  Making a Difference:  Tools to Help Judges Support the
Healing of Children, COURT REVIEW, Summer 2002 at 24.
15. See Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 2.
16. For guidance on some of the methods of control used by abusers,
the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project in Duluth, Minnesota
has developed a graph to depict the dynamic and characteristics
of domestic abuse: the Power and Control Wheel. The corollary is
the equality wheel, which shows how power should be shared in
a healthy relationship. These graphs can serve as useful guides to
screening for domestic violence. See Domestic Abuse Intervention
Project, available at http://www.duluth-model.org/daippce.htm.
17. See National Judicial Institute, supra note 1, at 7-55–7-58.
18. See id.
19. See Lawyer’s Handbook, supra note 5, at Ch. 13.  See also Barbara
J. Hart, Rulemaking and Enforcement, the Violent and Controlling
Tactics of Men who Batter and Rule Compliance and Resistance, the
Response of Battered Women, in I AM NOT YOUR VICTIM: ANATOMY
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 258-263 (Sage Publications, ed. 1996).
B. WHAT ARE THE RISKS AND CONSEQUENCES OF NOT 
KNOWING WHETHER THERE IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN A RELATIONSHIP?
The consequences of not knowing whether there is domes-
tic violence in a relationship could be severe.  There is a risk of
death for battered women, the children, or the abuser.26 Even
short of death, not knowing about domestic violence in a rela-
tionship that comes before the court can lead to a lack of safety
for adult and child victims, and allow children to continue to
be exposed to abuse.  
The court may unwittingly allow its processes to become
another method for more abuse, and allow the power imbal-
ance and manipulation to continue.  Rather than the court
making the rules, the abuser continues to make the rules and
the court and other players become manipulated and under the
batterer’s control.  Unfortunately, when distracted by the bat-
terer’s manipulations and his attempts to focus blame on the
victim, it can be easy for the court to lose focus on safety, on the
interests of the children, and on the needs of the adult victim.
Ultimately, the victim might be blamed for abuse, and the con-
sequences to children, and the abuser may not be held account-
able for his conduct.  Not knowing whether there is domestic
violence in a relationship can ultimately limit the court’s ability
to provide necessary resources and autonomy for battered
woman, which can mean that returning to the batterer is the
only option available to her.
One way to think about this is to recognize that domestic
violence relationships are necessarily different than a relation-
ship where domestic violence is not a factor.  Generally speak-
ing, the expectations that the public and courts have of healthy,
intimate relationships are that there will be equality and mutual
respect between intimate partners, that conflict will be mutual,
that power is relatively equal, and that both parents are con-
cerned primarily about the well-being of the children. 
Relationships in which there is domestic violence are
markedly different than those expectations.  In a domestic vio-
lence relationship, there is an extreme power imbalance; the
abuser’s concern is not for the children, but rather for himself,
and maintaining control.27 The conflict between the parties is
not mutual conflict between equals, but abuse of one party by
another.28
Relationships with domestic violence can actually appear to
outsiders to be healthy relationships that meet our expectations
of equality, mutual respect, and primary concern for the chil-
According to Barbara Hart, the four rules invariably most
important to batterers are:   
1. You cannot leave this relationship unless I am through with
you.  
2. You may not tell anyone about my violence or coercive con-
trols. 
3. I am entitled to your obedience, service, affection, loyalty,
fidelity, and undivided attention. 
4. I get to decide which of the other rules are critical. 20
Notably, leaving the home or the relationship breaks all of
the universal rules of batterers.  So, far from guaranteeing
safety, when the battered woman attempts to leave, the violence
against her and the children is likely to increase.  To the bat-
terer, leaving or attempting to leave can represent his ultimate
loss of control over his victim and can lead to lethal violence.21
5. The victim’s behavior is often a way of ensuring
survival.
The conduct of domestic violence victims may sometimes
seem “counterintuitive”—the victim fails to leave the situation,
even though it may objectively appear to be intolerable.   Her
failure to leave doesn’t necessarily indicate a lack of desire to do
so, but rather that she is afraid, doesn’t have resources, fears
that he will become lethal if she leaves, or for some other rea-
sons, leaving is not a viable option.22
The fact that the battered woman did not call the police or
other agencies does not mean that she and the children were
not assaulted and terrorized.  Only about one in ten women
victimized by a violent intimate sought professional medical
treatment.23 Domestic violence perpetrators can be charm-
ing.24 Battered women may fear that the perpetrator will be
believed and that they will not.  Because of concern that they
will not be believed when compared to the batterer and his
smooth-talking version of events, or because of intimidation,
embarrassment, or other reasons, many battered women do not
seek help from police or other agencies.  “The most common
reasons given by victims for not contacting the police were that
they considered the incident a private or personal matter, they
feared retaliation, or they felt the police would not be able to do
anything about the incident.”25
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20. For more information about rulemaking, see Barbara J. Hart,
supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., Barbara J. Hart, The Legal Road to Freedom (1991) avail-
able at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/hart/legalro.htm; Martha
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issues of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Margo Wilson and Martin
Daly, supra note 3, at 10.  
22. See Susan McGee, Why Some Battered Women Sometimes Stay:
Information for Professionals, available at http://www.comnet.org/
dvp. See also Michigan Judicial Institute, supra note 14; Nadkarni
and Shaw, supra note 14.
23. BJS report, supra note 7.
24. See Bancroft and Silverman, supra note 2, at 15-16.
25. See BJS report, supra note 7.
26. Commonly identified lethality factors include a prior history of
violence, obsessive possessiveness and morbid jealousy, threats to
kill, a perception by the abuser that he has been betrayed.
Additional risk factors include specific threats to harm or abduct
the children or an extended fantasy of murder/suicide of the fam-
ily. See Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 48 (citing Robin Hassler et al.,
Lethality Assessments as Integral Parts of Providing Full Faith and
Credit Guarantees, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES
(2001) available at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/FFC/chapter9.html). 
27. See Bancroft and Silverman, supra note 2.
28. See Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered
Parents and Their Children in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. &
CONCIL. CTS. REV. 273 (July 1999).
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29. See id.
30. See Joan Zorza, Friendly Parent Provisions in Custody
Determinations, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 8 (Dec. 1992).
31. See Dalton, supra note 28.
32. See Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 89-90 (summarizing research that
“approximately 70% of contested custody cases [in the United
States] that involve a history of domestic violence result in an
award of sole or joint custody to the abuser,” citing Jane Aiken
and Jane Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases,
34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 43-62 (2000).  A recent revision of Professors
Aiken and Murphy’s article appears in this issue of COURT REVIEW.
See Jane H. Aiken and Jane C. Murphy, Dealing with Complex
Evidence of Domestic Violence: A Primer for the Civil Bench, COURT
REVIEW, Summer 2002, at 12 
dren.  Only by understanding the various tactics and manifes-
tations of domestic violence, and knowing what to do in a case
where there is domestic violence, can courts provide necessary
relief to the victims.
These expectations about relationships become what judges
and other professionals expect to see of parties in court.
Because we expect equal power, when there are conflicts, our
belief is that the conflicts are the fault of both parties, and that
the parties should have equal ability to resolve conflicts with-
out outside intervention.29 Given that premise, when a party
appears to be unwilling or unable to resolve a conflict with
their intimate partner, they may be seen as obstructionist.
Safety is not a primary concern, because each party is assumed
to be equally able to walk away from the conflict.  The belief
may be that if there was violence, it was a one-time event that
will be resolved by separation. Even in cases in which the par-
ties are in conflict or disagree about other issues, the overrid-
ing assumption is that they are each concerned with the wel-
fare of the children above all.
Domestic violence cases present differently than judges’ and
other professionals’ expectations of how parties in a domestic
relations case should act.  Because domestic violence is not con-
flict between equals, but rather abuse based on unequal power
and control, the assumption that the parties are equally able to
resolve the conflict does not apply in a case where there is
domestic violence.  Although the expectation is that a parent in
a family law case should be cooperative with the other party in
facilitating parenting arrangements, an abused party may have
good reasons—primarily safety for herself and her children—
for not cooperating in parenting time arrangements, even when
ordered by the court.30 The expectation is that both parents
should and will put their own interests aside in favor of the wel-
fare of the children. The abuser’s interest is not in the welfare of
the children, but in maintaining his power over them and his
victim.  Unlike the situation where there is no domestic vio-
lence, safety must be a primary concern; separation can exacer-
bate the danger, rather than eliminate the conflict.
The disparity between the expectations for how a family law
case should be resolved and the reality of a case involving
domestic violence can lead courts to make the wrong decisions
about what should happen in a case.31 For example, if there is
domestic violence in a case and the court requires that a par-
ent facilitate parenting time with the abuser, that can put the
children and the abused parent in danger if the abused parent
follows the court’s order.  If the abused parent puts safety as the
primary consideration and refuses to follow the court’s order to
facilitate the children’s relationship with the abuser, then she
could be punished by the court for acting contrary to its expec-
tation, and she could then lose her children to the abuser.32
In order to make the best decisions for battered women and
children who are exposed to domestic violence, the court must
understand domestic violence and recognize that the process-
ing and decisions in a case involving domestic violence must
necessarily be different than the processing of and decisions in
a case not involving domestic violence. For example, the goals
of joint decision making, getting along, compromise, meeting
to work out problems, and sharing responsibility for the failure
of the marriage or subsequent problems do not work in a case
marked by the power and control dynamics of domestic vio-
lence.
Asking the parties to work out their own parenting time
schedule and details would be comparable to asking a former
hostage to return to his captors alone, without any weapons or
back-up support, to negotiate the surrender of weapons and
the release of other hostages or goods.  The hostage takers have
all the guns, power, and ability to control the outcome to their
design.  Similarly, the battered woman and her children have
no relative power without legislative and court assistance to
design a custody or parenting time plan that can help them
stay safe.  The court is in the best position to help the battered
woman equalize the power between her and her batterer and
to ensure that she has the resources necessary to remain free
from her former partner’s violence and control.
C. DO ALL SYSTEM PLAYERS UNDERSTAND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE?
Courts necessarily rely on a number of professionals to pro-
vide them with information or assistance in a given case.   For
example, in a domestic relations case, those professionals might
include a custody evaluator, guardian ad litem, a therapist, or a
mediator or facilitator, among others.  In a criminal case, pro-
bation officers, pretrial services personnel, and other law
enforcement personnel may provide information or do back-
ground screening for the court system.  In any kind of case, the
attorneys for the parties also are charged with being officers of
the court and providing accurate information to the court,
albeit from the perspective of an advocate for a party.  The infor-
mation that the court receives from those professionals may be
inaccurate or incomplete if domestic violence is a factor in the
case, and the professionals don’t screen for, or understand,
domestic violence.  Bad information can lead the court to make
decisions that are based on false assumptions or an incorrect
understanding of the situation, and those decisions can in fact
be harmful to the abused party and the children.
D. WHAT ARE THE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO FIND OUT
WHETHER THERE IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN A 
RELATIONSHIP?
Screening for domestic violence is critical to determining
what are appropriate court and system responses in the case.
33. See Bancroft and Silverman, supra note 2.
34. See Hart, supra note 3. 
35. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE
POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES (1999).
36. See id. at 176.
37. One example of a screening tool used to identify high-risk behav-
iors or history that would identify someone who needs further
assessment before sentencing on a domestic violence offense was
developed by the Colorado State Court Administrator’s Office and
directed for use by the Division of Probation Services of the
Colorado state courts.  The Colorado Domestic Violence
Screening Instrument (DVSI) asks about such things as prior
court involvement on domestic violence and non-domestic vio-
lence cases, recent separations, and employment history.  A copy
of the DVSI is on file with the author.
Given the prevalence and high risk of harm in cases where
domestic abuse is a factor, it is essential that court personnel
screen for domestic violence in every case that involves family
members or intimate partners.  What follows are a number of
different screening questions that can help the questioner deter-
mine whether domestic violence has occurred in a case.  After
determining that domestic violence has occurred in a case, the
court or other relevant professional must evaluate the actions
that it can take to provide safety and autonomy for the abused
party and the children, based on an understanding of domestic
violence and the use of power and control tactics by the abuser.
1. Screening considerations 
a. Demeanor and conduct of the parties
As with any case, it is essential that the investigator develop
a rapport with the parties and understand that revelations about
painful issues may not occur fully or immediately. Compassion,
patience, empathy, and active listening skills are critical and
will be essential to obtaining necessary information in these
cases. An awareness that batterers can appear charming and
calm, while the victim may be fearful and agitated, can help
court personnel as they assess the domestic violence in the case.
Batterers are, by their nature, manipulators.33 The cautious
court investigator or judge will be able to assess the truth by lis-
tening carefully to what is said, and by looking for signs of
power and control in the parties’ statements or demeanor.  
Also, the screener should understand the context of domestic
violence: perpetrators make rules that the victim must follow,34
while certain behavior or words of the perpetrator may be
threatening or harmful to the victim even though they may seem
harmless or even kind to outsiders.  A key screening device
therefore is to understand what the batterer’s actions or words
mean to the victim.  By asking: “What does that behavior mean to
you?,” the court can understand the conduct of the batterer, and
use that information to interrupt the batterer’s rulemaking, and
therefore help keep the battered woman and her children safe.
b. Demeanor of the questioner
A review of judicial behavior in domestic violence cases in
Massachusetts found that judicial demeanor was critical to the
process and the outcome of these cases.35 Helpful judicial
responses include: 
• Prioritizing women’s safety. 
• Making the court hospitable to abused women.
• Supportive judicial demeanor by listening to abused women
and asking questions.
• Connecting women with resources.
• Taking the violence seriously.
• Focusing on the needs of children.
• Imposing sanctions on violent people. 
• Addressing the economic aspects of battering.36
When screening for domestic violence, the demeanor of the
questioner is critical to getting good information and creating
safe and final outcomes.
The screening tools outlined below give some examples of
questions that the investigator can adapt to suit her or his style
and practices. Some keys to remember in gathering this infor-
mation are: 
• The investigator should not be judgmental when asking the
screening questions. 
• The questions should be phrased in the investigator’s own
words.  If a written questionnaire is used, it should be sup-
plemented with questions in a face-to-face interview.
• The questions should be introduced with a nonthreatening
opening, such as, “Because abuse and violence are so com-
mon in intimate relationships, I ask about it routinely.”
• The information related to domestic violence should be
asked about in every case where intimate partners or family
members are involved.
• Both parties may minimize the abuse or not identify it as
“domestic violence.” 
• The more specific the questions, the more likely it is that
the information elicited will be accurate. Asking, “Has there
been domestic violence in your relationship?” will not pro-
vide accurate or enough information to determine whether
domestic violence has in fact occurred, or whether precau-
tions are necessary to protect the parties and the court per-
sonnel from harm.
2. Tools to identify domestic violence: 
screening questions 
a. Identifying lethality risks
Lethality increases at the time of separation.  There are a
number of lethality assessment tools and checklists that can
help a fact-finder determine whether a domestic violence per-
petrator may become deadly.  Although no one can predict
with absolute certainty which domestic violence offenders will
become lethal, some warning signs include:37
• Suicidal or homicidal ideation, threats, or attempts.
• Escalation (or sudden decrease) in frequency and severity of
violent episodes.
• Access to weapons or threats to use weapons.
• Prior criminal behavior or injunctions.
• Depression or substance abuse.
• Obsession or preoccupation with victim.
• Stalking behaviors.
• The victim believes he will become lethal.
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1027 (Spring 1995).
41. See Lawyer’s Handbook, supra note 5, at 2-1–2-11.
42. See Presentation at a Continuing Legal Education for Kansas
mediators at Washburn Law School, Topeka, Kansas, August 8,
1997.
b. Identifying cases with prior court involvement
One of the most apparent means of discovering information
about domestic violence history in a relationship is to deter-
mine whether there has been prior court involvement by either
party.  Court personnel should be cautioned, however, that the
lack of prior court or police involvement does not necessarily
mean that there is no domestic violence between the parties or
that reports of current domestic violence are not truthful.38
Court personnel should also be aware that victims may be
arrested and charged with domestic violence when they were
defending themselves against the primary aggressor.39
Therefore, any screening must be mindful of these issues and
with awareness of the myths about domestic violence victims
and perpetrators.  
Some questions that can help determine whether there has
been prior court involvement might include:
• Are there now, or have there ever been any criminal charges
brought against either party?  If so, in what court?  What
was the outcome?
• Has any other court ever issued an order involving either
party?  If so, what court?  What did the order provide?
• Has either party ever been arrested?  If so, when? Where?
• Is there a personal protection order issued involving either
party?  If so, what court issued it?
• Has any other court ever issued an order for custody, sup-
port, or parenting time regarding any of the parties’ chil-
dren?
c. Other screening tools
1. AMA screening guidelines
The American Medical Association has developed diagnos-
tic and treatment guidelines for cases of domestic abuse.40
Those guidelines suggest that doctors ask their patients ques-
tions included in the following list. Those questions are easily
adapted to the court investigation setting:
• Are you in a relationship in which you have been physically
hurt or threatened by your partner?
• Are you in a relationship in which you felt you were treated
badly? In what ways?
• Has your partner ever destroyed things that you cared
about?
• Has your partner ever threatened or abused your children?
• Has your partner ever forced you to have sex when you did-
n’t want to? Does he ever force you to engage in sex that
makes you feel uncomfortable?
• We all fight at home. What happens when you and your
partner fight or disagree?
• Do you ever feel afraid of your partner?
• Has your partner ever prevented you from leaving the
house, seeing friends, getting a job, or continuing your edu-
cation?
• Does your partner use drugs/alcohol? How does he act
when he is drinking or on drugs? Is he ever physically or
verbally abusive?
• Do you have guns in your house? Has your partner ever
threatened to use them when he was angry?
2. ABA screening suggestions
The ABA Commission on Domestic Violence has developed
a lawyer’s handbook, which gives practical, useful information
about domestic violence for lawyers and judges.41 Many of the
ABA’s proposed questions are similar to the AMA’s. Some addi-
tional screening questions outlined in the ABA’s publication
that may be adaptable to investigations include:
• Do you ever do anything differently because of the conse-
quences of a fight?
• Has your partner ever put his hands on you against your
will, or forced you to do something you didn’t want to do? 
• Does your partner criticize you or your children often?
• Has your partner ever tried to keep you from getting med-
ical help? Kept you from sleeping at night?
• Has your partner ever hurt your pets or destroyed your
things? Does your partner throw or break things during
arguments?
• Is it hard for you to have relationships with friends or rela-
tives because your partner disapproves of, argues with, or
criticizes them?
• Does your partner make it hard for you to keep a job or go
to school?
• Does your partner withhold money from you? Do you know
what your family’s assets are? If you wanted to find out, or
to find any important documents like birth certificates,
passports, bank books, house deed, would your partner
make it difficult for you to do so?
3. Other screening aids
Larry Rute, then with Kansas Legal Services, proposed the
following screening questions for mediators, which could be
adapted for use by other court professionals:
• Are you fearful of the other person for any reason?
• Are you afraid you will be harmed?
• Have you ever been threatened?
• Have you ever been harmed?
• Have you had to call the police for protection?
• Have you ever stayed in a shelter?
• Are you afraid to answer these questions?
• Are you afraid to be in the same room with the other party?
• How can I tell when he/she is angry?
• How can I tell if you are angry, frightened, or upset?
• Can you ask for a break if you are feeling uncomfortable? 42
To screen for violence from a different perspective, some
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sample questions developed by the Alternatives for Domestic
Aggression program in Ann Arbor, Michigan,43 include:
• Was there violence in your family (of origin)?
• During conflict do you often threaten someone, break
things, punch walls, slam doors, ignore her, or leave?
• Do you have mood swings, where one moment you feel lov-
ing and affectionate, and the next moment angry and threat-
ening?
• Have you ever shoved, grabbed, hit, slapped, or choked your
partner, or any past partners?
• Do you find it difficult to talk to your partner about your
feelings, your hopes, your fears?
• Do you tend to blame others for your behavior, especially
your partner?
• Are you a very jealous person?
• Do you try to control how your partner thinks, dresses, who
she sees, how she spends her time, how she spends her
money?
• Do you try to discourage her from seeing her friends or fam-
ily?
• Do you get angry or resentful when she is successful in a job
or hobby?
• Do your conversations quickly escalate into threats of sepa-
ration or divorce?
• Do you ever threaten to hurt her, yourself, or others, if she
talks about leaving you?
• Do you do or say things that are designed to make her feel
“crazy” or “stupid”?
• Do you blame alcohol, drugs, stress, or other life events for
your behavior?
• Do you feel guilty after aggressive behavior and strive for
your partner’s forgiveness?
• Do you think that you could never live without her, yet other
times want her out?
• Do you use sex, money, or other favors as a way to “make
up” after conflict?
• Is your partner afraid of you sometimes?
E. WHAT CAN BE DONE ONCE THE FACT-FINDER KNOWS
THAT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS A FACTOR IN A CASE?
1. Develop protocols
According to the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges, communities that are concerned about domestic
violence “are asked to confront a new and compelling set of
facts: (1) adult domestic violence and child maltreatment often
occur together and (2) new responses are required of everyone,
if violence within families is to stop.”44
The protocols that courts and court personnel may develop
will depend upon the nature of the information sought, the cir-
cumstances of the parties, and the individual court’s caseload
and resources, among other factors.  At minimum, courts
should develop procedures that will ensure that the court envi-
ronment is a safe one for disclosure and that court personnel
and other system players become as educated as possible about
domestic violence.  Local guidelines should address such top-
ics as training of court personnel on domestic violence; points
in the proceedings when the parties will be given a specific
opportunity to talk about violence in their relationship; proce-
dures for promoting safety and confidentiality; and when and
what referrals will be made.  
Mediation, and other processes that are based on a presump-
tion of equal power, should allow for a victim to opt out with-
out negative consequence to that party.45 If mediation is under-
taken, the mediation session should be done in a way that
enhances safety and allows a victim to provide information to
the mediator about the violence in a confidential, safe setting.46
The process should also allow a victim to bring a support person
into the mediation session if she desires, even if the other party
does not. Any agreements discussed in mediation must be sub-
ject to attorney review and court approval and should be viewed
from the perspective of safety and autonomy for the abused
party.  The victim should not be pressured into making an agree-
ment, and the lack of agreement through mediation should not
be viewed as obstructionist if there is domestic violence.  
2. Recognize what can be solved through court
processes
Courts have tremendous power to stop a batterer from con-
tinuing his power and control over the victim.  The most effec-
tive interventions are those that hold the safety of battered
women and their children paramount and that provide for con-
sistent, swift, and sure consequences for battering behaviors.   
Courts can promote safety for battered women by issuing
protection orders; contrary to popular opinion that they are
“just a piece of paper,” protection orders have been found to be
effective, particularly when the court and law enforcement sys-
tems enforce them.47 Courts can also promote safety by taking
away the batterer’s rule-making power, and making and enforc-
ing rules against the batterer.  Rules need review, enforcement,
and consequences for noncompliance.  In order to be effective
against an abuser, a court’s rules and orders need to be
reviewed, enforced, and provide for clear and swift conse-
quences for noncompliance.  
Some courts use regular review hearings, in criminal cases
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and family law cases, to monitor the conduct of an abuser and
to ensure that the abuser knows that the court is paying atten-
tion.48
3. Safety of the children and the battered partner
should always be the primary concern
In custody and parenting time cases, child and victim safety
follows when one recognizes that battering a partner is per se
bad parenting.  It is not in a child’s best interest to be ordered
to live with a batterer, or to visit a batterer without clear and
effective safeguards for the child’s safety.49 In addition,
research shows that batterers are difficult to change—many
batter in subsequent relationships, so the presence of a new
partner for the batterer may not be a safety valve for the chil-
dren.50 When making any order in a domestic violence case,
the court should actively ask itself whether it is doing every-
thing that it can to keep the children and the non-abusive par-
ent safe and alive.
4. Don’t hold women to impossible standards of par-
enting, and recognize their efforts to stay safe.  
Put the blame for the battering where it belongs—on the
perpetrator.51
5. Draft all orders with safety as the primary consid-
eration.  
“Father’s rights” or “parent’s rights” should always be sec-
ondary to safety.52
6. Recognize that keeping the mother safe can trans-
late into keeping the children safe.  
As one means of ensuring that the mother is safe, the court,
as part of its decision-making process, can inquire whether a
woman has a safety plan.53 Courts should also order tempo-
rary custody or possession of the children as part of temporary
restraining orders to ensure that children are safe, and make
supervised parenting time (supervised by a non-related third
party) the first choice until the perpetrator actually demon-
strates that he is fit to have the children unsupervised.54
7. Orders must be clear, specific, and detailed as to
the definite terms of the order, and should include
built-in consequences for noncompliance.
There should be no room for ambiguity or negotiation.
Orders should be vigorously enforced and perpetrators held
accountable.55
CONCLUSION
The processing of a family law case where there is no domes-
tic violence is necessarily different than that of a case where
there is domestic violence. What would appear to be reasonable
and helpful in a case without domestic violence can actually be
harmful and even deadly in a case where domestic violence has
occurred.  Once a court or a professional identifies that domes-
tic violence is a factor, then the court must shift its usual way
of thinking about, and processing, a family law case.  Without
that paradigm shift, the court may be creating greater problems
than it solves in the families that come before it.
Julie Kunce Field is a law teacher and attorney
who has conducted numerous trainings for
judges, attorneys, law enforcement, mediators,
and others on domestic violence and the law.
She lives and works in Fort Collins, Colorado.
Summer 2002 - Court Review 11
A previous version of this article was published in the American Bar
Association’s Family Law Quarterly: Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy,
Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43 (Spring
2000).  Court Review appreciates the permission granted by the
American Bar Association to reprint the article, in an updated version,
here.
Footnotes 
1. See generally, Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and
Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY LAW REVIEW
1505 (1998); Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L.R. 1498, 1528-51 (1993).  Changes in crim-
inal laws, including creating new criminal sanctions to fit the pat-
terns of domestic violence and encouraging the enforcement of
existing criminal sanctions in domestic situations, have also
developed in the last decade.  See Bonnie J. Campbell, U.S.
Department of Justice, A Message from Violence Against Women
Office Director, Bonnie J. Campbell, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT NEWS, July 1996, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/vawo/
newsletter/bjc796.htm (last modified July 2, 1996).
2. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have some form of pro-
tection order statute. These statutes typically provide for eviction
of the abuser from the home, temporary child custody, and a pro-
hibition against continued abuse.  Some state statutes provide for
monetary relief for the duration of the order.  The duration of the
order varies with each state and ranges from 60 days to 3 years.
See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal
Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and
Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993).
3. See The Family Violence Project of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Family Violence in Child
Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29
Fam. L.Q. 197 (1995). 
4. See id.
5. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 2, at 812.
6. See, e.g., Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction in DO
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 1-5 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa, eds., 1996). 
7. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 210-12 (1979);
Molly Chaudhiri & Kathleen Daly.  Do Restraining Orders Help?
Battered Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 227, 245-47 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1992); Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Battered
Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy, 4 WOMEN & POL., 13, 19-20
(Fall 1984) (concluding that protection orders are most effective in
curtailing abuse when the level of violence is not severe); Lisa G.
Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 61, 70 n.35 (1984).  10  See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT (1994).
8. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT (1994).
9. Comment, The Search for Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse in
Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 HAWAII L. REV. 221, 252 (1998)
(hereafter The Search For Truth) (describing the unequal power and
control in abuse relationships, which leads to victims recanting
their allegations, resulting in a “heightened” necessity for admitting
evidence of prior abuse in domestic violence cases.); Lisa Marie
DeSanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice
for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367-
368 (1996) (finding that victims of domestic violence are uncoop-
erative in approximately 80% to 90% of criminal prosecutions).
10. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM (1999). 
11. See e.g., Comment: Prosecuting Domestic Crimes: Effectively Using
Rule 404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountable for Repeated Abuse, 34
New laws and policies aimed at protecting victims ofdomestic violence have been adopted across the coun-try throughout the last twenty years.  The legal
approaches taken to protect battered women and control fam-
ily violence have brought about significant changes in family
law.1 New laws include statutes permitting civil protection or
restraining orders,2 and laws requiring that domestic violence
be considered in custody and visitation decisions.3 Both of
these types of statutory reforms can provide protection to adult
victims of domestic violence and their children.  Evaluating a
parent’s fitness by considering past acts of violence to other
family members results in decisions that are more likely to pro-
tect children than decisions that discount or disregard spousal
abuse.4 Civil protection orders can provide abused women and
their children with a quick and easily accessible remedy that
provides housing, financial relief, and an order of child cus-
tody.5 While there is some controversy about the effectiveness
of such orders in cases involving severe violence,6 most advo-
cates and scholars agree that these statutes contribute to
improving the lives of women and children.7
The effectiveness of these new laws in reducing the inci-
dence of domestic violence, however, has been limited for a
number of reasons.8 One of the major barriers to using these
laws is the difficulty litigants often encounter when trying to
prove domestic violence.  First, the alleged victim is often the
only witness to the abuse.  For a variety of reasons, victims are
reluctant to testify against their abusers and pursue civil and
criminal remedies.9 Even when they do testify, women who
experience domestic violence sometimes exhibit characteris-
tics that make them less believable. Despite changes in legal
and popular conceptions of domestic violence, judges10 and
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(1991); Audrey Stone & Karla Digirolama, Battered Women’s
Expert Testimony, Past and Present, 271 PLI/EST 181 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 800 So. 2d 595 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000) (admitting testimony of domestic violence expert who
described the characteristics of domestic violence and stated vic-
tims often remain in abusive relationship or remain silent about
the abuse).
14. Courts have noted the usefulness of expert opinion.  For exam-
ple, in Pratt v. Wood, 621 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1994), the court
held that expert testimony in the field of domestic violence was
generally admissible because the average person is uneducated on
the psychological and behavioral characteristics typically shared
by victims of abuse in a familial setting.  Id. at 553.
15. See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. App. 1999).
In Gomez, the court found that the expert testimony explaining
the victim’s recantation had to be excluded. The court found that
before such testimony could be credited, the prosecution had to
prove that the victim suffered from battered women’s syndrome.
But see People v. Williams, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356 (2000) (“In the
context of the reason for admission of the evidence in this case,
we disagree with the limitation placed on evidence pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1007 in People v. Gomez. There is nothing
in Evidence Code 1107 to suggest that the legislature intended
that a batterer get one free episode of domestic violence before
admission of evidence to explain why a victim of domestic vio-
lence may make inconsistent statements about what occurred and
why such a victim may return to the perpetrator. . . .  Additionally
we believe that the concept of having to prove that a victim of
domestic abuse has previously been battered … is not appropriate
in the context of this case.”); See also People v. Morgan, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 772, 773-74 (1997) (holding that battered women’s syn-
drome expert testimony is admissible to rehabilitate a recanting
victim’s credibility without a proffer of evidence of a preexisting
attempt to introduce as much evidence of the abuse as they can
gather. Established principles of evidence law, however, pre-
sent particular challenges in domestic violence litigation.
While there is expansive literature on evidentiary challenges in
criminal prosecutions for domestic violence, there is very little
written about the way courts have looked at particular eviden-
tiary issues in civil cases in which domestic violence is at issue.
This article is intended to assist judges in anticipating and
responding to some of the evidentiary challenges in civil cases
involving domestic violence.
First, expert testimony is often necessary to dispel common
myths about battered women and to educate judges and juries
about the dynamics of domestic violence.  Recent case law,
however, has limited the admissibility of “non-scientific”
expert testimony, making the court’s qualification of experts
more challenging.  In addition, particular evidentiary issues
arise when alleged victims are pursuing both criminal and civil
remedies against the alleged batterer.  This article explores the
ways that may effect civil actions arising from the domestic
violence.  Finally, we discuss the difficulties in using prior bad
acts evidence.  Because batterers tend to engage in repeated
acts of abuse, evidence of prior acts may be particularly rele-
vant in proving the extent of harm and predicting the likeli-
hood of future abuse.  Traditional principles of evidence law,
however, often prohibit the admission of other crimes, wrongs,
and acts.
I. THE USE OF EXPERT OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF
BATTERING
When assessing whether domestic violence has occurred,
the court often must understand a complex context and cope
with inevitable misconceptions and incomprehensible contra-
dictions regarding the alleged victim’s perceptions and reac-
tions.  A battered woman’s survival strategies appear maladap-
tive, illogical, and unstable.  For example, despite brutal abuse,
the woman stays in the relationship; she seems to fail to pro-
tect her child from her abuser; her resulting alcohol or drug
abuse may cause her to neglect her child; she may minimize or
deny the abuse; she may appear erratic and unreliable because
she continually relocates to
avoid the abuser.12
Research reveals that a
battered woman remains in
her abusive relationship
because her abuser con-
vinces her she cannot sur-
vive outside the relation-
ship.13 She may rationalize
that her child’s need for a
father outweighs the dam-
age of his abuse.  She may
realistically fear that he will
kill her if she escapes, or she
may simply believe she can-
not afford to support herself and her child without him. Expert
opinion illuminates these paradoxes for the judge or jury.14
Three types of expert opinions facilitate an understanding of
the dynamics and perspectives underlying a domestic violence
relationship: (1) the clinically based opinion, (2) the social
framework opinion, and (3) a hybrid of the clinically based and
social framework opinions.  The clinically based expert assesses
the relationship and can offer opinion evidence about the par-
ticular effects of battering on this specific relationship. Social
framework experts put clinical data in perspective, usually
without any clinical relationship with the parties.  The social
framework expert clarifies the contradictions and the miscon-
ceptions regarding domestic abuse. The hybrid expert offers a
clinical opinion about the abuse and effects in this particular
relationship and explains the behavior of the abused person.  
Too often, courts limit expert opinion to clinically based
testimony and are more skeptical of useful social framework
testimony.  This limitation may result from an erroneous belief
that battered women’s syndrome testimony remains the only
admissible expert testimony in a domestic violence case.15
Although evidence regarding battered women’s syndrome can
be used to establish a self-defense claim to murder or assault
under some state’s laws, it remains inadequate when attempt-
ing to explain fundamental contradictions within an abusive
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abusive relationship between victim and defendant).
16. The battered women’s syndrome has come under significant criti-
cism in recent years.  Many critics suggest that it perpetuates neg-
ative stereotypes about victims of violence and tends to patholo-
gize their natural reactions to abuse.  See, e.g., DONALD DOWNS,
MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND
THE LAW (1998); EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED
WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS (1988); Pamela Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert
Testimony on the Battered Women’s Syndrome, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER &
L. 485 (1998); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
17. See, e.g., Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered
Woman Syndrome Evidence: Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593 (1999) (exploring and
evaluating the use of expert testimony in the prosecution of a bat-
terer); Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Supplement Annotation, Admissibility
of Expert Testimony Concerning Domestic-Violence Syndromes to
Assist Jury in Evaluating Victim’s Testimony or Behavior, 57 A.L.R.
5TH 315 (1998) (collecting and analyzing criminal cases in which
the courts considered whether and when expert testimony regard-
ing domestic violence syndromes may be used to assist the jury in
evaluating a victim’s testimony or conduct); Audrey E. Stone,
Presenting Battered Women’s Expert Testimony: Trial And Error, in
HANDLING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE 1998, at 255 (PLI New
York Practice Skills Course Handbook Series No. F0-001V, 1998)
(discussing that prosecutors increasingly find it useful to use
experts in domestic violence cases to explain the conduct of a vic-
tim, such as when a victim recants, changes her story, or contin-
ues to live with the perpetrator); Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis:
Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effect in Criminal Cases, 11
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75 (1996) (providing information and analysis
about expert testimony in cases involving battered women);
Steven I. Platt, Women Accused of Homicide: the Use of Expert
Testimony on Effect of Battering on Women—A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 25 U. BALT. L. REV. 33 (1995).
18. See e.g., Pratt v. Wood, 620 N.Y.S. 2d 551 (App. Div. 1994).  For a
general review of the use of social framework evidence, see
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use
of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987); and Michael J.
Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1011 (1990).
19. See Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L .REV. 414 (1952).
20. See id.; see also Donald G. Dutton  with Susan K. Golant, THE
BATTERER, A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE (1995).
21. Ohio Evid. Rule 702, BALDWIN’S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West
2000).
22. State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
23. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (holding
that the question of admissibility of expert testimony is review-
able under “abuse of discretion” standard).
24. See MARY ANN DUTTON, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE
CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
[Research Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice and U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, NCJ
160972 (1996)]. 
25. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1997) (dis-
senting judge calls into question the objectivity of the expert
because she worked for a child advocacy center). 
26. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999)
(holding that an inquiry into both relevance and reliability applies
not only to “scientific” testimony but to all expert testimony).
27. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-
relationship.16 There is an
abundance of social science
literature on abuse. Courts
often undervalue social-
framework testimony because
they view it as general infor-
mation rather than specific
application.  While many aca-
demics have heralded the use
of domestic violence expert
opinion in criminal cases, few
have discussed its use in the
civil arena.17
Social framework opinion
evidence often assists the fact-finder in understanding the evi-
dence or in determining a fact relevant to material issues.
Therefore, it fits the requirements of Rule 702 or its common-
law equivalent.18 A litigant may challenge this expert opinion
as within the common experience of the fact-finder urging the
court to disallow the expert because such information remains
unnecessary or not “beyond his or her ken.” 19 On the contrary,
most common experience regarding abuse remains a miscon-
ception.20 A few states directly address the need to admit
expert opinion evidence to correct common misconceptions
regarding abuse.  For example, Ohio Rule 702 includes the lan-
guage, “A witness may testify as an expert if...[t]he witness’
testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or
experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception
common among lay persons.” (Emphasis added). 21 The Ohio
legislature changed Rule 702 after the issue was raised about
expert opinion regarding domestic violence.22 Judicial discre-
tion in admitting this evidence is substantial.  A trial court’s
admission or denial of expert testimony faces abuse of discre-
tion review.23 This makes it all the more important that such
rulings are well considered at the trial level. 
Courts that admit this evidence face additional hurdles.  For
example, in domestic violence cases, “experts” often lack edu-
cational degrees. Rules regarding expert opinion specifically
allow expertise based on experience.  Therefore, domestic vio-
lence workers may qualify as experts to testify regarding their
knowledge of abuse arising from their experience working
with women in shelters or other settings.24 Even when an
expert possesses the requisite educational degree, courts may
be urged to reject the opinion as insufficiently “scientific.”  A
litigant may characterize domestic violence experts as “advo-
cates,” lacking in “scientific distance.”25 This view damages the
expert’s credibility, limits the effectiveness of the expert testi-
mony, and may cause disqualification of the expert.
Recent United States Supreme Court rulings on expert opin-
ion may have had the effect of privileging scientific inquiry.26
This may increase the court’s use of standard scientific require-
ments, like testability, peer review, publication, rate of error,
and general acceptance.27 These scientific requirements often
inappropriately assess the worth of social science studies or the
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95 (1993).
28. But see generally David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer
Syndrome: A Psychological Theory of Evidentiary Munificence, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 817 (1996) (discussing a misappprehension among
lawyers about both the difficulty of doing social science research
and the law’s proper response when social science is difficult to
conduct).
29. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test
still remains quite viable in many states.  Essentially, for expert
opinion to be admitted, it must be scientific knowledge derived
through a method that is generally accepted among the relevant
scientific authorities.  This test places part of the decision about
whether this evidence is “reliable” outside the court and within
the purview of scientists. 
30. California Evidence Code section 1107 provides in pertinent part:
In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible 
. . . regarding battered women’s syndrome, including the
physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs,
perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence
. . . .
The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert
testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its rele-
vancy and the proper qualifications of the expert witness.  Expert
opinion testimony on battered women’s syndrome shall not be
considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is
unproven.
31. Keesee v. Keesee, 675 So.2d 655, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(Griffin, J. concurring).
32. See generally, Myrna Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of Batterers’
Profiles and Expert “Social Framework” Background in Cases
Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147 (1997)
(proposing a reformulated model for the use of expert testimony in
domestic-violence-related cases wherein prosecutors would be per-
mitted to introduce domestic-violence social-science framework
evidence that is not syndrome or profile oriented in order to level
the evidentiary playing field and provide a background against
which domestic violence evidence can be understood at trial).
33. See, e.g., Garces v. Garces, 704 So.2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).  In Garces, the wife’s expert psychologist testified
about the wife’s psychological condition as a result of domestic
abuse. The psychologist recommended that the wife consult with
a psychiatrist at least once monthly and that the wife should
attend individual therapy twice a week for at least a few years.
The trial court included in the final judgment the following pro-
vision: “The husband shall be required to pay any presently out-
standing and all reasonable future medical, psychological, psychi-
atric, counseling and medication expenses for care and treatment
required by the wife as a result of his egregious conduct which are
not covered by her medical insurance and for those items which
are covered, the husband shall be responsible for any uncovered
portions, including payment of any deductibles.”). 
34. Sometimes the judge needs no expert to see the risks posed by plac-
ing the child with a violent person.  Judges generally award unsu-
pervised visitation in these cases. See, e.g., Berg v. Berg, 606 N.W.2d
clinical experience of the expert.28 In those states relying on
the Frye standard, the court may find that such expert opinion
is not “generally accepted in the scientific community.”29
Some states specifically address this problem.  For example,
the California evidence code specifically exempts social frame-
work evidence from the Frye test when offered to educate the
fact-finder about the common misconceptions regarding a vic-
tim’s behavior.30
In a case where testimony included a tape recording of a
violent incident in which the husband battered the wife with a
camcorder after threatening to “smash [her] face in” in front of
the children on Christmas morning, a concurring Florida
appellate judge voiced his discomfort regarding the reliability
and competence of a court-appointed expert in the case:
I am bound to say, however, that I am increasingly
concerned about the proliferating and extensive use of
psychologists in these family law cases and the extreme
reliance trial courts appear to place on their opinions.
These experts conduct interviews, sometimes do tests
and then are allowed to render opinions on an extraor-
dinary range of subjects.  They have been allowed to
offer opinions on a why a child nestles with its parent
(no, it’s not necessarily love), whether someone is
prone to domestic violence, who is telling the truth,
and who is “in denial.” Yet, no one seems to be able to
muster any measure of the competence or reliability of
these opinions.  On the one hand, it is certainly desir-
able to bring before the court as much evidence as pos-
sible to assist the trial court in making the best decision
concerning the raising of the children in families torn
by divorce.  On the other hand, the rules of evidence
exist for a reason, and the
issue of competency of
such broad reach of expert
testimony is not some-
thing that should be taken
lightly—particularly in
such cases where there is
frequently little other
objective or disinterested
evidence on which the
court can rely.31
Despite some courts’ reluctance, social framework testi-
mony remains critical in domestic violence cases to explain
victim behavior.32 Experts are often the only witnesses who
can educate the fact-finder regarding the unfathomable
dynamics underlying domestic violence relationships, and the
subtle, confusing facts of abuse. 
People inexperienced with domestic violence usually won-
der why a victim did not escape her abuser.  This issue arises
in requests for orders of protection (why now?), in custody
determinations (if he is so abusive, why did you stay and
expose the children to this?), in requests for rehabilitative
maintenance33 (why did you leave college while you were mar-
ried and now want him to pay?), in tort actions (you consented
to this treatment, so why should you be heard to complain
now?), and in myriad other settings.   Expert opinion explains
why the victims minimize abuse and keep abuse a secret from
friends, family, clergy, or physicians.  
Domestic violence experts facilitate custody determina-
tions.34 It is often heard in the halls of family courts that some-
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895, 899 (N.D. 2000) (although the statute places a heavy burden
of proof—clear and convincing evidence—upon the perpetrator of
domestic violence to show unsupervised visitation will not harm
the child, the statute imposes no burden on the custodial parent to
prove, by expert testimony or otherwise, that unsupervised visita-
tion with the more violent parent will in fact harm the child).
35. The Link Between Child Abuse and Domestic Violence, CHILD
PROTECTION LEADER (American Humane Association Sept. 1994). 
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1998) (holding expert
testimony is allowed but not required to prove effects of domestic
violence on child’s emotional and mental state); In re Marriage of
Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa App. 1994) (admitting expert
testimony to detail the tragic and long-term consequences of
spousal abuse on children who witness the violence); In re
Marriage of Houtchens, 760 P.2d 71 (Mont. 1988) (allowing
expert in field of social work and domestic violence to testify that
children are at risk living with men who batter, both because of
the likelihood that the child will be battered and the likelihood
that the child will rely on that person as a role model); Chafin v.
Rude, 391 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. App. 1986) (allowing court’s
expert to testify that domestic violence jeopardized the child’s
emotional development).
38. AMERICAN JUDGES FOUNDATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & THE
COURTROOM: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM, KNOWING THE VICTIM.
This publication is periodically updated; the current version can
be found at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/domviol/booklet.html. 
39. “Friendly parent” provisions are typically legislation that consid-
ers which parent is most likely to foster the relationship with the
other parent and considers that behavior as a positive factor in
determining the best interests of the child. Manuel E. Nestle,
Child Custody Determination on Termination of Marriage, in 34 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 407.
40. See Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204, 1208 (Miss. 1992) (clinical
social worker testified (1) that victim struggled with low self-
esteem, (2) that her low coping skills indicated her husband emo-
tionally abused her, and (3) that her condition would not prevent
her from caring for the children).
41. See, e.g., In the Matter of J.D. v. N.D,  652 N.Y.S. 2d 468 (1996)
(finding that the respondent was engaging in protective behavior in
response to the petitioner’s exercise of power and control over her).
42. Windham v. Windham, 616 So.2d 276, 297 (La. App. 1993).
43. Faries, 607 So.2d at 1210.
44. To qualify for the “learned treatise” exception to the hearsay rule,
an expert must testify and affirm that the treatise is authoritative,
or the party offering the treatise must prove its reliable authority
by another expert or by judicial notice.  This essentially allows the
party to offer the information through an expert and minimize the
costs of production of an expert or allows a party to cross-exam-
ine that expert without having to hire a battering expert.  See Fed.
one beats his wife but is a good
father.  Recent literature illu-
minates the fallacy of such a
belief.  Forty-five to 70% of
battered women in shelters
report that their batterers com-
mit some form of child
abuse.35 Even using the more
conservative figure, child abuse is 15 times more likely to occur
in households in which there is domestic violence.36 Moreover,
children simply witnessing domestic violence without them-
selves being abused are still more likely to grow up with serious
maladaptive behavior patterns.   Experts facilitate custody deter-
minations by offering insight into the current and potential
effects on children in a domestic violence household.37
It as been estimated that approximately 70% of contested
custody cases that involve a history of domestic violence result
in an award of sole or joint custody to the abuser.38 Such
awards may result from the recent trend in which more and
more states adopt “friendly parent” provisions as a factor in
assessing which parent should receive custody of the chil-
dren.39 A mother may find herself in a “Catch-22.”  If she fails
to report the abuse, the court labels her an ineffective or
neglectful mother failing to protect her child.  If she reports the
abuse, the court may label her an “unfriendly parent” afflicted
with parental alienation syndrome, and she may lose custody
of her child.  This trend necessitates a critical distinction
between an “unfriendly parent” and a mother attempting to
protect herself and her child from the abuser, particularly
when a victim minimizes her abuse or engages in maladaptive
self-help behaviors.40 Again, in such a situation, expert opin-
ion critically educates the fact-finder.41
Expert opinion may assist in sorting out particularly difficult
determinations. Of course, when parties make competing
claims, either or both parties may use experts, and these experts
may be court appointed. For example, a Louisiana court faced
a husband who physically abused his wife but not his minor
child.42 The court admitted testimony of a court-appointed
psychologist.  The expert testified that the father remained a
stronger nurturer than the mother.  The court ordered joint cus-
tody primarily because the mother prevented the father from
seeing the child, and the joint custody provision of the
Louisiana statute promoted a frequent and continuing relation-
ship with both parents. In contrast, a Mississippi court faced a
father asserting that his wife was unfit to care for their chil-
dren.43 The court admitted testimony of a clinical social
worker. The expert testified that the mother struggled with low
self-esteem, that her low coping skills indicated her husband
emotionally abused her, and that her condition would not pre-
vent her from caring for her children. The court affirmed the
award of custody to the father based on the chancellor’s findings
that the father had cared for the children while the mother was
in school, that his possession of the house provided the chil-
dren stability of a home environment in familiar surrounding,
and that the mother had hidden the children for 23 days.
As useful as experts may be, they are often costly and
impractical. The summary nature of order of protection hear-
ings makes calling an expert unlikely even if the party could
find and afford one. If an expert is testifying in a civil action,
costs can be substantially reduced through the introduction of
“learned treatise” type evidence, relying on articles from rep-
utable journals to assist in evaluating the social framework of
the case.44 This can also be offered by briefing the court and
opposing party on the relevant issue, with expert writings used
to educate the court about the effect of the domestic violence
on the woman and her children. 
16 Court Review - Summer 2002
As useful as
experts may be,
they are often
costly and 
impractical.
R. Evid. 803(18). 
45. An excited utterance is admissible if the statement relates to a
startling event and is made while under the stress of that excite-
ment.  See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). 
46. Many jurisdictions are using “victimless prosecution” strategies
thus necessitating creative application of the hearsay exceptions.
Some states are even creating evidentiary rules that reduce the
reliance on victims in these prosecutions.  See CAL. EVID. CODE §
1370 (1997). This evidentiary rule allows the admission of
hearsay statements in a domestic violence case if such a statement
narrates, describes, or explains the infliction or threat of physical
injury and the declarant is unavailable to testify.  The statement
must have been made within at least five years of the infliction of
injury and must be written, electronically recorded, or provided
to a law enforcement official.  
47. For a detailed and thoughtful discussion of “victimless prosecu-
tions,” see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose, Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1996). 
48. A public record generally requires either the testimony of a cus-
todian of records, a document under seal, or, in some states, a
“business record affidavit” establishing the authenticity of the
document.  The document must be produced by a public agency
and generally includes reports setting forth the activities of the
office or agency, matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by
law as to which matters there is a duty to report (this likely cov-
ers the police report at the scene) or factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law.
See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
49. Missouri, like many states, allows the introduction of business
records without the custodian provided the party offering the
business record has an affidavit from the custodian of records
swearing to the foundation and timely notice is given to the
opposing party.  MO. REV. STAT. § 490.692 (2001).
50. Generally, police reports cannot be used against criminal defen-
dants in criminal actions due to their confrontation clause impli-
cations. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.803(8)(2002); AR EVID. RULE
803(8)(2002); IOWA R. EVID. 5.803(8)(2002); 12 OKLA. ST. §2803
(2003); D.R.E. 803(8)(2002).  Some states also limit the use of
police reports in civil actions. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §
908.03(8)(2002); MINN. EVID. RULE 803(8)(2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§8C-1. Rule 803(2002).
51. Actual physical violence is not required to prove that the event
was “startling” for purposes of establishing an excited utterance.
A threat should be enough. See Donna Meredith Matthews,
Making the Connection: A Proposed Threat Hearsay Exception, 27
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 138 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988);
State v. Woodward, 908 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1995); State v. Anderson,
723 P.2d 464 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
53. The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule admits any state-
ments by a declarant that concerns that declarant’s then-existing
state of mind, emotional sensation, or physical condition.  This
includes statements of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feel-
ing, pain or bodily health, but not statements of past condition.
See, e.g.,  Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).  
54. Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment include
statements describing present symptoms and past medical history
as long as the statements are designed to elicit medical care.  This
certainly covers statements made to a treating physician that are
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.  If the victim seeks care
through the police officer taking the call, then her statements
might qualify for an exception.  However, if she merely is report-
ing the events and not seeking medical care then the statements
II. EVIDENTIARY IMPLICATIONS OF CONCURRENT CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Often, order of protection hearings occur in the shadow of
a criminal prosecution for assault.  This creates particular evi-
dentiary issues that have both substantive and strategic impli-
cations.  Police practices in anticipation of a criminal prosecu-
tion may be different.  Police often play a more active role in
gathering physical evidence, obtaining 911 tapes and medical
records of treatment following the incident.  Instead of merely
writing a brief report of a domestic dispute, many police forces
are being trained to produce police reports that record “excited
utterances”45 and other hearsay exceptions within the docu-
ment.46 Therefore, the police report can be used to conduct
“victimless prosecutions” when the victim decides to withdraw
the criminal complaint and does not wish to testify.47 These
more detailed investigations and reports can be quite useful as
supplemental and corroborating evidence of the domestic
abuse in the protection hearing and subsequent divorce or cus-
tody proceedings.  
The foundation requirements for the police record are the
same as those for a public record.48 Many states allow such
records to be authenticated by affidavit provided notice is
given to the other party.49 Unlike a criminal case, the record
can be used against the alleged perpetrator without the police
officer present and subject to cross-examination.50 Being able
to use the police report without the officer’s presence and tes-
timony may be particularly important in an order of protection
hearing because the cases tend to be heard on an expedited
basis, the parties are often
unrepresented, and the pro-
ceedings are often summary
in nature.  
Any hearsay statements
included in the report must
also meet hearsay excep-
tions.  “Excited utterances”
may be the most likely
hearsay exception covering
a victim or witness’s state-
ment if the report is taken at
the scene and only shortly
after, or during, the violent
incident.51 The timing can be significant.  If the police arrived
within 30 minutes of the assault, then the statements are likely
to qualify.52 Longer lapses of time may make this a more diffi-
cult argument.  Other hearsay exceptions that may cover vic-
tim or witness statements within the police documentation
include present sense impressions (in some jurisdictions),
state of mind exception (provided her state of mind is an issue
in the case),53 and statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment.54
The hearing on the protection order is likely to occur prior
to the prosecution and becomes a source for discovery and
preservation of testimony.  This cuts both ways for the parties.
The future prosecution may create an imbalance in the court-
room.  In anticipation of the criminal prosecution, it is far
Summer 2002 - Court Review 17
“Excited 
utterances” may be
the most likely
hearsay exception
covering a victim
or witness’s 
statement if the
report is taken at
the scene . . . .
will not qualify.   See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). 
55. See MO. REV. STAT. §.455.060(3) (1999) (mandating that findings
in an order of protection hearing are not res judicata).
56. See A. HARRELL, ET AL., COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS OF
RESTRAINING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS (Urban
Institute 1993).
57. In the majority of state courts, the “law of evidence” has been
incorporated into a code of evidence.  In many of these codes,  the
section numbers and content conform with the Federal Rules of
Evidence.  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
MODERN EVIDENCE 51.2 at 4 (1994).  The references in this article
to Rule 404(b) evidence refer to evidence of other acts of abuse.
About a dozen states have no comprehensive code of evidence but
rather an amalgam of rules derived from case law, statutes, and
constitutionally based rules.  In these states case law has devel-
oped which defines the parameters of the exclusion of prior bad
act evidence. Id.
58. Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402. 
59. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
60. Fed. Rule Evid. 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that
upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal
case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
Although the evidence is commonly referred to as “prior”
crimes or bad acts, the federal rule (and most state counter-
parts) includes evidence of acts committed both before and
after the incident at issue in the litigation.
61. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET. AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 at 637
(5th ed. 1999). 
62. Other policy reasons for excluding prior bad act evidence relate
primarily to criminal prosecutions for domestic violence and are
generally focused on guaranteeing the presumption of innocence.
For example, if evidence that a defendant committed a similar
crime is admitted, a jury may require less than proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt because the defendant is not an “innocent” party
or, in the case of prior uncharged crimes, because he needs to be
more likely that the respon-
dent has retained counsel
whereas the victim may still
be without representation.
An alleged perpetrator can
use the hearing to preview
the future criminal case.
The testimony of the victim
often provides a source of
impeachment material, par-
ticularly if she is unrepre-
sented.   This may become a
time to vigorously cross-
examine the victim and
witnesses in the hopes of discouraging them from going for-
ward with the prosecution.  
Some criminal attorneys have sought continuances in the
protection order hearings, citing their client’s Fifth
Amendment privilege not to be forced to testify.  Although
delays do not leave victims unprotected (the temporary stay
away order is usually extended), the victim is denied other
relief that may be necessary for her to sustain separation, such
as court-ordered mortgage payments by the perpetrator, child
support, and protected visitation.  In some cases, the law lim-
its the number of continuances that can be granted and courts
face the task of determining whether to deny the victim her
relief or perhaps violate the Fifth Amendment right of the per-
petrator.  Some states have attempted to remedy this problem
by preventing the use of the respondent’s testimony in any
future proceeding and by ensuring that the finding of abuse is
not treated as res judicata (for future claims in which a finding
of abuse could have an impact on the determination).55
On the other hand, alleged victims can benefit from the pro-
tection hearing occurring before the prosecution.  Future crim-
inal defendants may also provide inculpatory testimony in this
setting when testifying about the alleged abuse.  The timing of
the protection hearing increases the likelihood that the lawyer
for the defendant in the criminal case has not done sufficient
investigation of the case, has had little time to understand the
story from the alleged perpetrator’s perspective, and is reason-
ably reluctant to allow the client to discuss the issue under
oath.   Such testimony may be admissible in the subsequent
prosecution for both its impeachment and substantive value as
party admissions.  A represented victim may therefore be at a
decided advantage in settlement.  To avoid a finding of abuse
and to keep the defendant off the stand, a respondent may be
willing to negotiate with his victim to create an order that may
not otherwise be available after a hearing.56 These provisions
include matters such as child support, maintenance, super-
vised visitation, disposal of household guns, mandated drug
tests as a condition of visitation, and repayment of the costs
associated with the violence. 
III. INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF PATTERN OF ABUSE
IN CIVIL CASES 
The law of evidence in most states57 is governed by general
principles favoring admissibility as long as the evidence is rel-
evant58 and is not unduly prejudicial.59 Thus, most rules of
evidence have developed as exclusionary rules—that is, the
evidence is presumed admissible unless some  rule of evidence
excludes it.  Trial judges have wide discretion in balancing the
probative value of evidence against its potentially prejudicial
impact.  
One of the long-standing categories of evidence that is gen-
erally excluded is evidence of other charged and uncharged
crimes and bad acts.60 The so-called “propensity rule”61 pro-
hibits the introduction of prior bad acts to prove that the
defendant acted in conformity with his bad character. The the-
ory is that a judge or jury will convict or hold the defendant
liable, not on proof of the wrong charged, but because he has
a propensity to commit similar crimes or bad acts.62 Although
rules against admission of this type of evidence are most often
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punished for the prior act.  
63. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s
Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which
Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 574, 576 (1990).
64. The Search for Truth, supra note 9, at 240, citing Anne L. Ganley,
Understanding Domestic Violence in IMPROVING THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM’S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  A RESOURCE MANUAL
FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 18 (1995). See also, Letendre, Beating
Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence
Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973
(2000).
65. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW ART. § 4-504 (b)(ii)(1) (requiring inclu-
sion of prior abuse in petitions for protection); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 634   R.634.20 (WEST 1996); ARIZ. R.S. § 13-3602 (West 2000)
(“The court shall issue an order of protection . . . if the court
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe . . . the defen-
dant has committed an act of domestic violence within the past
year. . . .”); CAL. FAM. § 6300 (“an order may be issued to restrain
any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domes-
tic violence. . . if an affidavit shows. . . reasonable proof of a past
act or acts of abuse.”).   
66. 674 A.2d 951 (Md. App. 1996).    
67. Id. at 258-259.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
also approved the admission of evidence of prior abuse in protec-
tion order cases noting that “a [batterer’s] past conduct is . . . per-
haps the most important [evidence] of his probable future con-
duct. . . . This is especially true in the context of a marital or sim-
ilar relationship.”   Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.
App. 1991) (citation omitted).
68. 674 A.2d at 260.  The Coburn court also offered a related justifi-
cation for admitting prior abuse evidence in noting that the char-
acter of the accused as an abuser is at issue in protection order
proceedings.  Id. at 260-61.  Even where the statute doesn’t direct
the court to consider history of abuse, it can be argued character
is directly at issue in custody and visitation cases where fitness of
invoked by defense attorneys in criminal cases, these rules
apply in both civil and criminal cases in most jurisdictions.63
Evidence of prior bad acts are especially relevant and pro-
bative in domestic violence cases because of the cyclical nature
of domestic violence.  As one commentator described it:
Domestic violence is never a single isolated inci-
dent.  Rather, domestic violence is a pattern of behav-
ior, with each episode connected to the others.  Many
times, as the pattern of abuse evolves, the level of
seriousness escalates.  In the most unfortunate
instances, the consequence of domestic violence is
homicide.  By allowing evidence of past specific inci-
dents of abuse in domestic violence cases, courts
could help to prevent this escalation.64
Prior acts of abuse are often necessary to prove to the fact-
finder the nature and seriousness of the abuse involved.  One
act of abuse may not warrant the same remedy as when there
has been a pattern of abuse between the parties.  Different reme-
dies are required when there is an isolated act of abuse that is
unlikely to be repeated as compared to a serious act of abuse
following a pattern of abuse.  The more abuse that occurred in
the past means a higher likelihood that future acts of abuse will
occur and, thus, the need for greater protective measures.     
Courts of limited jurisdiction that hear some domestic vio-
lence cases—protection orders and crimes classified as
minor—may not strictly apply the rules of evidence.  The tra-
ditional hesitancy to admit prior bad act evidence, therefore,
may not apply.  In other cases, where one or both of the liti-
gants are pro se, objections to this type of evidence will prob-
ably not be made.  In many cases, however, where the rules of
evidence are observed and parties are represented, the court is
likely to encounter evidentiary challenges to prior abuse evi-
dence.  A litigant may rely upon a variety of theories when
arguing for admission of pattern of abuse evidence in protec-
tion order or other civil proceedings where domestic violence
is at issue.  First, in some circumstances, the general prohibi-
tion on admitting prior bad acts evidence does not apply.  This
argument would be particularly persuasive when the statute
relied upon instructs the
court, either directly or indi-
rectly, to consider a history or
pattern of abuse.  Many pro-
tection order statutes, for
example, include a directive
to the petitioner to include
the incidents of past abuse in
the petition or may direct the
court to consider a history of
domestic violence before
granting particular relief in
the order.65
In Coburn v. Coburn,66 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed a trial court’s admission of prior evidence of abuse in
a protection order proceeding.  The court noted that the lan-
guage in Maryland’s protection order statute included both a
directive to the petitioner to include prior acts of abuse and
required consideration of the history of abuse before granting
certain kinds of relief under the statute.  After analyzing the
protection order statute’s references to past abuse, the court
concluded that the statutory references demonstrated the rel-
evance of past abuse evidence in deciding whether and what
kind of protection order should issue.67 The court went on
to state: 
The policy consideration underlying the general
prohibition against admission of evidence of prior
crimes or bad acts is that such evidence tends to prej-
udice the defendant because the trier of fact will
improperly use the evidence to determine the ultimate
issue of guilt.  This rationale does not apply in a civil
protective order hearing where the ultimate issue is
what, if any, remedy is necessary to protect the peti-
tioner based on the likelihood of future abuse.
Evidence of past abusive acts is admissible to show
that abuse is likely to recur and to help the court deter-
mine what remedies will adequately prevent future
abuse.  Hence, Md. Rule 5-404(b) is inapplicable and
evidence of prior incidents of abuse is admissible.68
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one or both parents is a primary consideration.
69. Boniek v. Dunick, 443 N.W. 2d 196, 198 (Minn. 1989) (finding
that text under the Domestic Abuse Act, “past abusive behavior,”
although not dispositive, is a factor in determining cause for pro-
tection”).  
70. Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah 1992) (reversing a trial court
decision denying a protection order and finding that the language
of the protection order statute required the court to consider past
abuse).
71. Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 775 A.2d 1249 (Md. 2001).
72. See Family Violence Project, supra note 1.   
73. Id.
74. Id. at 204.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT § 25-403 (2001);  COLO REV. STAT. ANN. §
14-10-124 (West 1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (West 2000);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16
(2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2000). 
77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2)(b)(2) (2000); IDAHO CODE SEC. 32-
717 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 1997); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subd. 2(d) West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-05-22.3 (2000); OKLA STAT. TIT. 10 § 21.1(d) (West 2000). 
78. See e.g., David M. Gersten, Criminal Practice; Evidentiary Trends In
Domestic Violence Cases, 72 FLA. BAR J. 65, 67 (1998) (discussing
language of Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Delaware, and
Florida custody statutes, which direct the court to consider past
abuse).  In some cases, however, the victim’s ability to introduce
evidence of past abuse is limited to certain types of evidence such
as felony convictions.  Id.  
79. See Gersten, Evidentiary Trends in Domestic Violence, 72 FLA. B.J.
65 (Aug. 1998). For example, Florida requires a conviction for a
third-degree felony or higher to establish a rebuttable presump-
tion that will preclude joint custody. See FLA. STAT. §
61.13(2)(b)(2)(2000). 
80. IDAHO CODE § 32-717(1997).
81. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App.
1995); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 886 S.W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994); Brown v. Brown, 867 P.2d 477 (Okla. 1993). 
82. OKLA. STA. TIT. 43, § 112.2 (2001 Supp.).
83. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), supra note 15. 
84. 593 A.2d 186 (D.C. App. 1999).  See also State v. Featherman, 651
P.2d 868 (Ariz. 1982) (acknowledging the significance of under-
standing the pattern of abuse in the relationship of the defendant
and victim to prove both motive and intent); People v. Thompson,
314 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. App. 1981) (evidence of prior bad acts,
such as threats to kill the victim, admissible to establish motive
for assault with intent to do great bodily harm). 
Other courts have also relied
on either the implicit69 or
explicit70 language of the pro-
tection order statute to find that
the court should admit and con-
sider evidence of past abuse
when issuing a protection order.
At least one appellate court
has found evidence of prior
abuse relevant to assess the rea-
sonableness of a woman’s “fear of imminent bodily harm”
under a state’s protection order statute.  In holding that a
woman’s fear from her husband’s act must be evaluated in the
context of prior abuse in the relationship, the court held:
A person who has been subjected to [abuse] may
well be sensitive to nonverbal signals or code words
that have proved threatening in the past to that victim
but which to someone else, not having that experi-
ence would not perceive to be threatening.71
In child custody and visitation cases, evidence of domestic
violence is often a critical part of the best interests assessment.
Most custody and visitation statutes direct the court to con-
sider the parties’ history of abuse.72 Most states require con-
sideration of domestic violence as a factor in the best interest
analysis.73 Almost every state requires courts to consider the
presence of abuse when making such determinations.74 The
effect of this evidence varies among the states. 75 Some states
prohibit the award of custody to a parent who has been found
to have committed domestic violence in the past.76 Others
have created a rebuttable presumption against awarding cus-
tody or visitation to the abusive parent.77 Courts vary in the
amount of evidence of abuse that they deem necessary to trig-
ger a finding that a parent has engaged in domestic violence.78
Some states require a conviction for a serious domestic vio-
lence-related crime. 79 Other states look for a pattern of vio-
lence.  Idaho requires a “habitual perpetrator,”80 Louisiana,
Missouri, and Oklahoma require that the abuse be ongoing or
part of a pattern of conduct.81 In most states, a mere prepon-
derance of evidence will suffice to prove domestic violence for
purpose of affecting the custodial decision.  Oklahoma, how-
ever, requires that such evidence be “clear and convincing.”82
In all of these situations, the legislature in the state has created
a “statutory exception” to the Rule 404(b) counterpart, thus
making prior bad acts evidence admissible.  
Dealing with objections to this kind of evidence when there
is arguably no statutory exception is more difficult.  Evidence
of prior domestic violence may be admissible under well-rec-
ognized exceptions to Rule 404(b).  Most rules prohibiting
admission of prior bad acts to prove character or propensity
permit the admission of such evidence when it is relevant to a
non-character issue such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of a
mistake, or accident.83 Case law on these exceptions in the
domestic violence area has focused primarily on criminal pros-
ecutions.   In Clark v. United States,84 for example, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed a case in which a man
who had killed his paramour claimed that he had done so by
accident.  The court held that “an attempt to restrict the vio-
lence [between the parties] to the events of the fatal evening
would unreasonably cramp the inquiry, to the detriment of the
search for truth.”  The court recognized in this and other cases
that the likelihood of mistake or accident diminishes when the
defendant has engaged in a pattern of abuse against the victim.  
Probably the most widely publicized litigation involving an
effort to introduce evidence of past abuse to show motive is the
O.J. Simpson prosecution.85 In that case, the prosecution was
successful in admitting some of the evidence (which included
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85. No. BA 0 9 7211 (Cal. App. Dep’t., Super. Ct., Oct. 3, 1995). 
86. David Gargolick, Prosecutors Win Key Simpson Fight: Judge Allows
Most Material About Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1995,
at B8.   
87. Lisa A. Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence in the
Criminal Prosecution: A Common Sense Approach, 16 PACE L. REV.
73, 74 (1995).  Of course, in this case such evidence did not lead
to conviction, but in many cases it would.
88. Klein & Orloff, supra note 2, at 848-876.    
89. 229 Cal. Rptr. 317, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).  The decision was a
departure from prior precedent, which permitted evidence of
prior crimes to prove a defendant’s identity only where the char-
acteristics of the prior bad acts were similar enough to the
charged crime to raise an inference that the crime was committed
by the same person. Id.
90. See e.g., People v. Santarelli, 401 N.E. 2d 199 (N.Y. 1980) (evi-
dence of prior bad acts may be admitted in anticipation of dis-
proving defendant’s anticipated defense that he was legally insane
at the time of the crime); Solomon v. State, 646 A.2d 1064, 1082-
83 (Md. App. 1994) (evidence of prior crimes may be admitted to
counter anticipated defense).
91. Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce:
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 366
(1997), citing Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:
The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1085 (1991); see also Roberta L. Valente,
Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law
Practitioner, 29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 191 (1995).  
92. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (2002) provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense
involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other domestic violence is not made inad-
missible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible
pursuant to Section 352.
(b)  In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this
section, the people shall disclose the evidence to the defen-
dant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the
substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, in
compliance with the provisions of Section 1054.7 of the
Penal Code.
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit or preclude the
admission or consideration of evidence under any other
statute or case law.
(d) As used in this section, “domestic violence” has the mean-
ing set forth in Section 13700 of the Penal Code. . . .
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the
charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless
the court determines that the admission of this evidence is
in the interest of justice. 
93. For opposing views on Fed. R. Evid. 413-414, compare Bridging
the Gap, supra note 9, with James L. McCandless, Prior Bad Acts
and Two Bad Rules: The Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (1997).    
94. Bridging the Gap, supra note 9, at 381. 
95. Proposals to follow California’s lead and adopt rules admitting
prior abuse evidence in domestic violence cases are being devel-
oped in other states as well.  See e.g., The Search for Truth, supra
note 9 (describing a proposal for an evidentiary rule for Hawaii
that would broadly admit prior abuse evidence in domestic vio-
lence cases).
testimony, photographs, “911” tape-recorded phone call by
victim) of physical beatings and threats by the defendant going
back several years from the date of the murder.86 The evidence
was admitted “to provide the jury with an appreciation of the
‘nature and quality’ of the relationship between Mr. Simpson
and Ms. Brown, and to aid in establishing motive, intent, plan,
and identity of the killer.”87
In the protection order context, evidence of prior abuse may
be relevant to prove the batterer’s intent, motive, or absence of
mistake.  For example, intent is an element of assault, battery,
and false imprisonment, all of which are included within the
definition of abuse in most protection order statutes.88
Evidence of prior abuse has also been admitted to prove
identity in criminal prosecutions.  In a leading California case,
People v. Zack,89 the defendant was charged with murdering his
girlfriend by beating her to death.  The California Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of
prior abuse against the victim to prove identity when the defen-
dant contended he was out of town the night of the murder. 
Evidence of prior bad acts may also be admissible to negate
anticipated defenses.  Again, this theory is not well developed
in the civil context, but there is ample precedent on the crim-
inal side for allowing prosecutors to admit evidence of a defen-
dant’s prior crimes in their case in chief  to counter anticipated
defenses.90 An increasingly common defense in protection
order and custody cases in which allegations of abuse are made
is that the victim has a motive to fabricate the allegations to
gain an advantage in a divorce or custody case.91 If the bat-
terer claims that the victim
fabricated some or all of the
allegations, the lawyer can
argue that evidence of prior
abuse should be admitted to
rebut this defense claim. 
Finally, at least one state,
California, has adopted a rule of
evidence that provides specifi-
cally for the admissibility of
prior bad act evidence to prove
propensity in domestic violence
cases under certain circum-
stances.92 California’s new rule
is based upon the recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 413
and 414, which permit, under certain circumstances, the admis-
sion of uncharged acts in sexual assault and child molestation
cases to show propensity and disposition.93 These “groundbreak-
ing” rules were enacted because of congressional “outrage that the
Federal Rules of Evidence were being used to keep the jurors from
finding out about the extremely probative evidence of uncharged
rapes unless the attacks were extremely similar in the facts.”94
While California’s rule only applies to criminal prosecutions for
domestic violence, practitioners may use it to argue for similar
treatment in civil cases in their jurisdictions.  The new California
rule may also reflect a trend in which legislators and judges rec-
ognize the distinctive nature of domestic violence cases and the
need to modify evidentiary rules to address these cases.95
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CONCLUSION
As states pass more laws enhancing the remedies available
to victims of domestic violence and recognizing its devastating
effects on children, the historical informality of these proceed-
ings is likely to fade and be replaced by greater adherence to
traditional rules of evidence. We have identified three types of
evidence that pose the greatest challenges for courts.   This
article outlines the kinds of considerations courts might use
(1) to admit expert opinion to enhance the understanding of
the effects of battering; (2) to benefit from the evidence gener-
ated due to a concurrent criminal actions while blunting
efforts of alleged perpetrators to manipulate that system; and
(3) to cope with the difficult admissibility problems posed by
the batterers’ prior acts of abuse. Understanding the dynamics
of abuse and its evidentiary consequences can help a court get
a more accurate picture of the abusive context and will go a
long way in protecting victims of domestic violence and their
children. 
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Domestic violence has emerged from the privacy of one’sown home, where only the victims were aware of the abuse,to more public domains, where one can witness the impact
of such abuse on society through our court system.  Judges, in
both the civil and criminal arenas, exercise considerable power in
instituting a wide range of possible dispositions in cases involving
domestic violence.  The Family Violence Prevention Fund’s
National Judicial Education Advisory Committee concluded that
judges made the most significant decisions affecting the lives of
victims, abusers, and their children.1 Judges can also play a sig-
nificant role in shaping society’s response to the issue of domestic
violence. 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PLACES CHILDREN AT RISK 
Our children’s futures are heavily impacted by domestic vio-
lence.  One study reported that 43% of female victims of domes-
tic violence live in households with children under the age of 12.2
Other recent studies have estimated that between 3.3 million and
10 million children witness domestic violence each year.  In addi-
tion, in a study of homicides related to domestic violence in
Massachusetts between 1991-1995, researchers found that in
more than one in eight domestic violence homicides, the abuser
killed one or more children.3
Domestic violence, by definition, is damaging to the children
who live with it.  Yet, in the courtroom, one hears parents and pro-
fessionals alike minimize its impact, saying that “the children did-
n’t know it was going on,” “they were never in the room,” or “he
may be a bad husband, but he loves his kids.”  The court stands
able to correct these misperceptions.
As noted above, the impact of domestic violence on the chil-
dren of the victims is far reaching and can affect many domains of
their individual functioning: behavioral, psychological, cognitive,
developmental, educational, and social.  While it is beyond the
scope of this article to illustrate the multitude of ways that domes-
tic violence impacts children, several authors offer a review of this
literature.4 Research over the last decade has shown that children
in families where domestic violence is present show trauma-
related symptoms similar to symptoms of children who have been
the direct victims of physical and emotional abuse at home.5 In
addition to the direct impact domestic violence has on the child,
it also inflicts damage by disrupting the victim parent’s relation-
ship to the child.6
UNCOVERING THE EXTENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
defines domestic violence as a “pattern of assaultive and coercive
behaviors often including physical, sexual, and psychological
attacks, as well as economic coercion, used by one intimate part-
ner against another.”7 Fortunately, judges in civil court proceed-
ings can take into account all forms of coercion possibly present
in a particular case, not only those defined as criminal behavior.
The primary goal of these behaviors is to maintain the abuser’s
sense of control over his family, and specifically the spouse/part-
ner.  
Given the increase in domestic violence matters reaching judi-
cial attention, it is critical that judges fully understand how their
decisions can play a significant role in preventing domestic vio-
lence injuries and deaths. 
EVALUATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In each family law case coming before the court with allega-
tions of domestic violence, the court needs to make a determina-
tion of how to proceed in the investigation and evaluation of this
issue.  
Given the data showing widespread domestic violence,8 the
court may wish to operate on the assumption that, when an alle-
gation of domestic violence has been made, it is likely that such
is present.  After investigation, the court should be able to articu-
late why the allegations have or have not been sustained. If
domestic violence exists, the court should deal with that, both in
the court order and in the enforcement and monitoring of that
order. It is sometimes argued that domestic violence is not a sci-
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ence, and therefore holds no “givens” that can be relied upon in
assessing its existence or absence in any particular case.  Actually,
a large numbers of studies document a number of typical perpe-
trator and victim behaviors, as well as the negative impact of
domestic violence on children.  These studies and expert infor-
mation, along with information that the parties and third parties
may possess, can be used to assess the probable existence of
domestic violence in an individual case.
Courts can take advantage of tools already developed by pro-
grams and individuals across the country that work in the field of
domestic violence intervention to more fully understand the
dynamics of the relationship before them.  Resources are available
to help in identifying domestic violence, assessing the lethality of
the perpetrator, helping the victim or survivor craft a workable
safety plan, and measuring the impact of domestic violence on
children.9
The success of an inquiry into a potential domestic violence
case first depends upon the amount and quality of information
one is able to acquire to evaluate.  Based on our clinical experi-
ence, a more complete picture of the domestic violence is
obtained by doing a domestic violence inventory, a lethality
assessment, and reviewing collateral information.
1.  Domestic violence inventory
A domestic violence inventory can summarize:
(a) The length of relationship and timeline of violence. 
(b) The types and extent of power and control used over time:
physical, sexual, psychological/emotional, or financial.10
(c) The first, last, and worst abusive incident. 
There are several reasons why a comprehensive detailing of
this information is valuable. First, it gives the court an under-
standing of this family’s experience over time. Second, there will
be clues in the information gathered as to the ongoing danger-
ousness of the violent parent and whether the abusive behavior is
escalating.  Third, the nature and extent of the abuse experienced
by the battered woman before the court may greatly impact her
ability to tell the story of her abuse in a coherent and credible
way, make decisions easily and with confidence, and “cooperate”
with the court.
2. Lethality assessment 
There are several reasons why the lethality assessment11
should be completed by a knowledgeable domestic violence pro-
fessional in the community.  These domestic violence profession-
als have accumulated their expertise by seeking out workshops
and training programs that focus on the unique nature of this
societal problem.  By specializing in this field, they know how to
interview the parties to get the maximum information in the least
intrusive way, and are better able to assess and understand the
meaning of the information they
have gathered.  They are less likely
to be fooled by a manipulative and
socially adept batterer, and more
likely to be sensitive to some of the
indicators of potential lethality.
They also are aware that stalking
behavior is a risk factor for
increased danger to the battered
woman and her children—and
that it can show itself in many
subtle forms (such as leaving flow-
ers or notes) that may be misread
by the untrained as “love,” con-
cern for his children’s well-being, sadness about the divorce, etc.,
rather than the ongoing threat that it is.  Last, these professionals
also are aware of another misunderstood behavior—the threat of
suicide by the abuser—that may also indicate homicidal intent.
3. Collateral information
Domestic violence can, and often does, exist with no other
adult witnesses or independent corroboration.  It is not unusual
that the divorce process, which often offers supportive commu-
nity resources to the battered woman, is the first time the vic-
tim/survivor feels safe enough to talk about the abuse.  The fact
that she was never able to call the police or report the violence to
a doctor or other professional may be an indicator of the extent of
control the batterer exercised over her.  It also may speak to the
level of his dangerousness.
By the time some cases involving allegations of domestic vio-
lence come before the court, the battered woman may have
received help from a number of professional support systems (such
as an attorney, a counselor for herself, another for her children, a
safe shelter for temporary housing) even though she may never
have called any of these people while the batterer still had access
to her.  To the court, these already involved professionals may be
seen as too immersed in the case to be objective.  In actuality, these
people may offer helpful insights into the case, especially if their
information is assessed in conjunction with other information, and
by someone with domestic violence intervention expertise.
MAKING SENSE OF THE INFORMATION
Each of us who assesses a case involving domestic violence is
impacted by the content of the information gathered, the
demeanor of the parties, our own education and life experience,
and the attitude toward the case shown by other professionals
involved.  It is crucial to examine each of those influences to
ensure the parties and ourselves that we are approaching our deci-
sion making in a competent and objective manner.
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When evaluating information
received as part of a domestic vio-
lence assessment, ask yourself:
(a) Does the story emerging add 
up to a coherent whole?  
(b) Does it make sense in the 
context of domestic violence?  
(c) Is there any other way to cor-
roborate parts of that whole?  
(d) What has been the opinion 
of other professionals 
involved?  
(e) If a panel of domestic violence
experts looked at it, what 
might their opinion be?
(f) Are there parts of the information that need clarification, or
domestic violence interpretation?  
(g) What does not make sense?  
(h) Whose opinion do you value in helping make sense of the
whole?  
It is essential that these cases not be handled in isolation.  Their
complexity requires the expertise of many disciplines in order for
the court to understand the dynamics well enough to craft an
order that is truly helpful to the family involved.
Safety vs. survival: A battered woman’s choice
If you have a woman in your courtroom who is a survivor of
abuse by her husband or partner, her presentation needs to be
understood in the context in which it is occurring.  Judith Lewis
Herman, in her book Trauma and Recovery, likens the process that
is imposed on battered women to that which prisoners of war
experience.12 In fact, batterers use the same coercive techniques
that Amnesty International recognizes as tools employed by war
captors to keep their victims’ compliant and under their control:
isolation, monopolization of perception, induced debility, threats,
occasional indulgences, demonstrating “omnipotence,” degrada-
tion, and enforcing trivial demands.13
A battered woman does not leave an abusive relationship for
the same reasons we all stay in situations longer than we want: lack
of perceived, acceptable alternatives; financial security; promises
made; love or caring about others; commitment; expectations of
others and self; and fear of failure. In addition, the victim may
remain in an abusive relationship because of fear of losing her chil-
dren or escalating violence.  The documented fact that a battered
woman is at most risk for homicide when or after she leaves the
abusive relationship provides greater understanding that her focus
is survival rather than safety.14 We, as a society, have never been
able to provide a battered woman with safety, so she chooses the
only realistic alternative:  survival.  This focus on survival may
require some choices or behavior on her part that seem counter-
intuitive to those of us on the outside.   She may never call the
police, or she might attack the police when they respond to a 911
call. She might insist the next day that the prosecutor “drop the
charges” against her batterer, or refuse to testify against him or tell
little of the truth on the stand.  She may go back to him in order
to survive.  It is important to understand this use of counterintu-
itive behavior patterns by the victim.  For the victim, she is most
concerned about and focused on what the abuser will next do to
“punish” her for the actions taken and not on whether she is act-
ing in a consistent manner.
Externalizing blame: The batterer’s belief system
If you have an accused batterer in your courtroom, it may help
to be familiar with the some of the characteristics common to
most men who batter.  According to Michael Lindsey, founder of
AMEND in Denver, Colorado (Abusive Men Exploring New
Directions), a batterer believes the following in relationship to his
violence: 
• I didn’t do anything wrong.
• If I did, I won’t get caught.
• If I do get caught, I can talk my way out of it.
• If I can’t talk my way out of it, the consequences will be
light.15
Batterers begin the story where it suits them, tell just enough of
the truth to be believable, and can often lie more convincingly than
their victim tells the truth.16 Batterers externalize blame for most
negatives in their lives, accuse their victims of “provoking” the vio-
lence, and justify their behavior as their right to be in charge of the
family.17 Many batterers convince their victims that no one, includ-
ing the court, will ever believe them if they disclose the abuse.
ASSESSING PARENTING RESPONSIBILITY 
AND PARENTAL ACCESS
In parenting responsibility and parental access determinations
involving domestic violence, domestic violence considerations
must be on center stage.  If the court fails to appropriately take
domestic violence into account when making parenting responsi-
bility or parental access determinations, victim parents may con-
tinue to remain in violent homes for fear of losing contact with
their children. 
Legal presumptions: Best interests of the child
Within the last decade, courts have begun to consider the
presence of domestic violence as a factor in parenting responsi-
bility or parental access determinations.  According to the
National Council of Family and Juvenile Court Judges, 44 states
and the District of Columbia have statutes that contain express
provisions that permit the courts to consider domestic violence in
some way in making custody decisions.18 There are three types of
state statutes, either (1) requiring the court to consider domestic
12. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA & RECOVERY (1997).
13. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982). 
14. See NEIL WEBSDALE, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1999). See
also AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE
ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY (1996). 
15. See Lindsey, et al., supra note 9.
16. See Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 4.
17. See DONALD DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN:
PSYCHOLOGICAL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES (1995). 
18. See National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Family
Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Courts and Legal
Practices, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197, 225-227 (1995).
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violence as a factor bearing on joint custody decisions; (2) requir-
ing the court to justify the awarding of any form of custody to an
abusive parent, presuming that domestic violence is not in the
“best interests of the child”; or (3) requiring the court to refrain
from awarding joint custody where there has been demonstrated
abuse. 19
Legal presumptions: “Friendly parent” provision
States have traditionally favored ongoing contact between a
parent and a child, and have tended to favor joint custody deter-
minations.  In domestic violence cases, such a determination,
absent careful consideration of the domestic violence, poses
grave emotional and physical safety risks for the children.  In
addition, courts will often favor the parent who is more willing
to cooperate and share parenting time (i.e., “friendly parent” pro-
vision). The issue of safety becomes one that is crucial for the
courts to understand as the victim parent may wish to conceal
her place of residence or place of employment.  The victim par-
ent may seek a restraining order or deny the abusive parent visi-
tation out of a sense of fear for her or her children’s lives. Clare
Dalton observes that a victim parent’s appropriate concern about
the abusive parent’s fitness to parent will more negatively affect
her chance to gain parental responsibility than his.20
Concomitantly, the abuser parent’s willingness to share parental
responsibility will positively affect his chances, even though his
ongoing access to the victim parent allows him to continue to
manipulate and intimidate her.  
Evaluative issues
In parenting responsibility or parental access determinations,
the courts appear to be attempting to balance the competing
rights and needs of the parents with the rights and needs of the
children.  This is a delicate balance when domestic violence is
present.  
Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman argue that the parental
responsibility or parental access evaluation needs to be con-
ducted by an evaluator familiar with the dynamics of domestic
violence and of the parenting behaviors of abusers.21 If that is
not done, then the courts may be basing their judicial decisions
on information garnered by someone who has not fully under-
stood the dynamics of domestic violence or the impact it has on
the children.
A thorough assessment should include:  individual interviews
with both parents; interviews with the children; an interactional
session (if possible and safe) between the children and each par-
ent; and collateral information (including, depending on the
case, medical records, school records, police and criminal
records, interviews with relatives and friends, interviews with
domestic violence shelter workers/advocates, mental health
counselors in the community and/or school, and other profes-
sionals involved with the fam-
ily).
The assessment and any subse-
quent orders must address:
(1) Safety.
(2) Parental capacity.
(3) Access, including super-
vised and unsupervised
parental access.
(4) Specific provisions and
consequences for viola-
tions of the order.
1. Safety
A thorough assessment of safety and security issues is impor-
tant in any matter involving domestic violence brought before
the court.  Safety should be a priority even when the issue of
safety is inconsistent with the presumption that a child should
have access to both parents.22 Sadly, it is reality that the most
dangerous time for any abused woman is when she is attempting
to leave or has left the relationship.23 During this period, the abu-
sive parent can no longer deny the status of the relationship and
must acknowledge his loss of control over his intimate partner.  
It is an erroneous assumption held by many in the legal and
psychological fields that emotional or physical violence ends
with the dissolution of the relationship.  Controlling and manip-
ulative behaviors, present during the relationship, often continue
and get played out in court during parenting responsibility or
parental access determinations.  Parental access often offers the
abusive parent additional opportunities to escalate the violence,
engage the legal system in his manipulation, and continue to dis-
parage the victim parent. 
2. Parental capacity
When considering the parental capacity of the abuser parent,
the children’s emotional and physical safety is the guiding factor.
To ensure the children’s safety, 
(a) The abuser parent must have the ability to understand the
effect domestic violence has had on the children and assume
responsibility for his actions.
(b) An assessment of the abuser parent’s coping responses is
deemed critical. Specifically, one would want to assess the
level of depression, helplessness, impulse control, and frus-
tration tolerance.  
(c) Other environmental and societal risk factors include the
abuser parent’s employment status, substance and alcohol
abuse, and history of domestic violence in his family of ori-
gin.24
(d) Finally, one might want to assess the abuser parent’s motiva-
tion for seeking parenting responsibility or access. Concern
19. See Leslie D. Johnson, Caught in the Crossfire: Examining Legislative
and Judicial Response to the Forgotten Victims of Domestic Violence, 22
LAW & PSYCH. REV. 271-286 (1998).
20. See Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents
and their Children in the Family Court System, FAMILY & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV., 37(3), 273-296 (1999).
21. See Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 4.
22. See Dalton, supra note 20.
23. See Websdale, supra note 14; see also American Psychological
Association Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family,
supra note 14.
24. See Peter G. Jaffe & Robert Geffner, Child Custody Disputes and
Domestic Violence, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE:
THEORY, RESEARCH & APPLIED ISSUES 371-408 (George W. Holden et
al., eds. 1998).
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should be heightened if there
is a sense that the abuser par-
ent wishes to continue to
impose control on the victim
parent/family through the
court system; suggests by his
words or actions a desire for
parental access as a way of
hurting and retaliating
against the victim parent;
wishes to prove that he is the
better parent emotionally; or
desires to lessen or avoid
child support payments.
As noted earlier in this arti-
cle, domestic violence has
traumatic effects on the vic-
tim’s emotional and physical
functioning and disrupts the victim parent’s relationship with the
child, as it tends to undermine the victim parent’s authority.  One
effect of such violence is that it can seriously compromise the vic-
tim parent’s capacity to effectively manage her children’s behavior.
An evaluation of the victim parent’s coping responses and ability
to manage stress, anger, and conflict is important in assessing her
ability to provide her children with a sense of safety and security.
It is crucial that the court regard not only the victim parent’s cur-
rent coping skills, which may be strained due to the pervasive
violation to her self-esteem, but also her past ability to cope with
situations.  
To ensure the children’s emotional safety, the victim parent
must be able to separate the child’s views (of the domestic vio-
lence) and needs from her own and be responsive to her child’s
needs.  It seems difficult for courts to assess the victim parent’s
ability to protect her children because of the traditional lack of
understanding of why a battered woman would stay in an abusive
relationship, and the misreading of her efforts to protect her chil-
dren by limiting their contact with the abuser parent when these
efforts impact what the courts see as the abuser’s parental rights.
Therefore, it is important for the courts to evaluate the victim par-
ent’s decisions in the larger context of domestic violence. While
the court is unable to see into the future, often a victim’s coping
abilities and functioning will soon recover once she feels safe and
removed from the abusive relationship, including the abuser’s use
of the court system.  
3. Access
In making a determination of access time, there are some
guidelines that have been proposed depending on age of the
child.25 The issue for the courts when domestic violence is present
becomes how much contact should the abusive parent have with
the child and what form should that contact take.  Should the con-
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tact be supervised, who should supervise the contact, and who
decides when the abusive parent’s behavior is appropriate? Prior to
the court making a determination on parental access, a thorough
assessment, with focus on lethality issues, should be conducted.
These might include addressing factors such as the presence of
weapons, fantasies of or threats of suicide or homicide, stalking
behaviors (e.g., surveillance, monitoring of telephone calls or the
victim parent/children’s whereabouts, and prior police involve-
ment).  Were these conditions to exist, the court should determine
that the risk is too great to guarantee the emotional and physical
safety of a child even in a supervised setting and suspend access. 
Supervised visitation between an abusive parent and his chil-
dren has been highly recommended when domestic violence has
occurred,26 and should be the norm until the abuser has com-
pleted a specialized batterer treatment program.27 Family mem-
bers are an extremely poor choice for acting as the supervisor for
the contact between an abusive parent and his child as they may
not believe the victim, may be intimidated by the abuser, and lack
the necessary domestic violence training.   
Unsupervised access can expose the child to further acts of vio-
lence, inconsistent or irresponsible parenting, continued under-
mining of the victim parent’s authority, and ongoing manipulation.
As a result, the child may feel unsafe during these unsupervised
contacts with the abusive parent.  According to Bancroft and
Silverman, supervised access does not guarantee a child’s emo-
tional safety unless the supervision is vigilant and conducted by a
professional familiar with the dynamics of domestic violence.28
Typically, when the courts order that supervised contact
should take place between an abusive parent and his child, such
is set for a defined period of weeks or months, rather than based
on the abuser’s behavior and the child’s behavior.  While it is
important to consider the child’s behavior toward the abusive
parent within the context of a supervised setting, it is equally
important to make note of the child’s behavior during the trans-
fers to the contact, the hours immediately after the contact, and
even the following day.  As mentioned above, the progression
from supervised to unsupervised visitation should not take place
until the abusive parent has successfully completed a recognized
batterer treatment program.29
When considering the movement from supervised to unsuper-
vised visitation, determinations should include finding that there
has not been: 
(a) Direct abuse or irresponsible behavior toward children
within the supervised context.
(b) Direct or indirect physical and/or psychological cruelty
toward the partner.
(c) Expressed or subtle expression of willingness to hurt the
children as an extension of hurting the victim parent. 
(d) Substance abuse.  
(e) Refusal to accept the end of the relationship.
(f) Sexual assaults toward the victim or boundary violations
toward the children. 
27. See American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on
Violence and the Family, supra note 14.
28. See Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 4.
29. See Field, supra note 10.
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(g) Threats to abduct or injure the children.
(h) Refusal to accept responsibility for past abusiveness.
Ongoing monitoring of the child’s emotional well-being
should dictate whether changes need to be made to the unsu-
pervised conditions, such that supervised parenting time may
need to be reinstated more than once over the lifetime of the case
CRAFTING AN ORDER
Before issuing an order, the court should have as thorough an
understanding as is possible about the domestic violence
specifics in a case, so that the order can, as clearly as possible,
address the issues of containment of the violent parent and safety
for the rest of the family.
An order is only as effective as it is specific and enforceable,
particularly so in domestic violence cases, where abusers will try
to exploit any inconsistency or vagueness to their own benefit,
often creating ongoing chaos for their ex-spouse or partner, their
children, and the court.
Recommendations for specificity in the order
First and foremost, an order should take into account the
safety needs of the victim parent and the children.  When super-
vised access is a condition, the order must be specific, including:
(a) The services to be provided.
(b) Duration and frequency of contact.
(c) Who may have contact with the children.
(d) Who will pay for services.
(e) Type and frequency of reporting back to the court about the
progress of visitation. 
(f) Whether a protection order is in effect, and what the para-
meters of the order are in regard to the visits.  
When unsupervised access is granted, the order should
include sufficient information for the transfers, if considered safe,
such as: 
(a) Specific dates.
(b) Specific times.
(c) Specific location or a neutral drop off or third party. 
(d) Building in consequences for noncompliance (e.g., for con-
tinued late return of the child).  
In addition, regardless of the length of the unsupervised con-
tact, it is recommended that the order include:
(a) Prohibitions from speaking poorly about the victim parent in
the children’s presence.
(b) Unrestricted telephone contact between the child and the
victim parent.
(c) Appropriate structure for safety, meals, and bedtimes.30
For both unsupervised and supervised conditions, restrictions
on alcohol and or drugs are important for the emotional safety of
the child.  These restrictions should apply not only for the con-
tact period itself, but also for 12 to 24 hours before contact with
the child.
Finally, long-term intervention programs, such as those offer-
ing appropriate domestic vio-
lence counseling, encompass-
ing anger management, skills
building, and accountability,
are seen as necessary agents of
change when parenting respon-
sibility and access determina-
tions are being made.  In addi-
tion, where appropriate, sub-
stance, alcohol abuse, and
mental health counseling is 
recommended.
Recommendations for ongoing monitoring
A batterer will take any opportunity to misinterpret or push
the limits of the order, continue to harass his ex-partner(s), and
create chaos for all involved.   An abuser needs to be given swift
and sure consequences every time he is in violation of the order.
It should not be solely the responsibility of the survivor to try to
hold him accountable.  Her focus should be to build a new, sta-
ble life for her children, one in which they can all heal from the
effects of the violence. If the court builds into the order a mech-
anism for review at a specified time, and a parenting coordinator
who is responsible for helping to problem-solve between times,
the burden is then placed on the batterer to change his behavior.
Again, it is helpful to have assistance from the community.  The
court may want to consider:
(a) Using a cross-disciplinary approach (involving professionals
from law, social work, psychology, and domestic violence). 
(b) Assigning someone to provide a case management function. 
(c) Building in periodic court reviews to assess progress or lack
thereof. 
(d) Ensuring immediate consequences for noncompliance, tak-
ing into account recommendations for those consequences
from the cross-disciplinary team, particularly from the bat-
terer treatment program professionals.
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL DEMEANOR
IN THE COURTROOM
Judicial demeanor can be as important to the process as is the
fashioning of the remedy in each individual case.  So believes a
judge in a Massachusetts courtroom,31 and we agree. The bearing
of a judge during court proceedings can have a profound effect
upon the power balance in the relationship of the parties.  It can
help or hinder the process of equalizing that power, which, solely
in the hands of the batterer, has facilitated the domestic violence
itself.  A judge’s confrontation and control of the batterer and
support of the nonviolent parent helps to set the tone of the post-
separation or post-divorce process, and can facilitate the begin-
ning of the recovery of the children.
A 1999 study conducted by James Ptacek in three court sys-
tems in Massachusetts measured the impact of judicial demeanor
on battered women seeking orders of protection.  Judicial
demeanor was defined as “the emotional presentation of author-
ity in the courtroom, the quality to the courtroom atmosphere
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Judicial demeanor
can be as 
important to the
process as is the
fashioning of the
remedy in each
individual case.
31. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER
OF JUDICIAL RESPONSE (1999). 
Effective assessment of and intervention with domestic vio-
lence families is crucial for the safety and security of our nation’s
children.  The court can either assist or hinder the children’s and
family’s recovery process.  A judge’s demeanor in the courtroom
and the orders set forth can lay the foundation for the family’s
healing.  To assist the court in crafting the most suitable orders
for a particular family, especially where domestic violence is
involved, a thorough evaluation of the abuser, his battering pat-
tern, and the impact that such behavior has on the family is
needed.  It is crucial to be able to assess the abuser’s behavior in
the context of a power-and-control dynamic and to be able to
understand the often counterintuitive behavior of the victim.
After carefully and systematically exploring and documenting the
domestic violence, the court can begin to craft an order where
safety and security concerns are the primary focus.  For the court
order to be effective, it must be specific, detailed, and enforce-
able.
Judith Herman observed that the psychic trauma produced by
violence may take a lifetime to heal, and that “the response of the
community has a powerful influence on the ultimate resolution
of the trauma.”33 The court may be one of the more powerful,
and immediate, voices of that community.
Lavita Nadkarni, PhD., is an assistant professor
and director of Forensic Studies at the Graduate
School of Professional Psychology at the University
of Denver, specializing in forensic psychology.  She
has conducted more than 500 parenting responsi-
bility evaluations. 
Barbara Zeek Shaw, M.S.W., is a social worker
who teaches in a joint law and social work domes-
tic violence clinic at the University of Denver’s
College of Law.  She has worked with domestic vio-
lence issues and the law for 25 years.
that a judge produces with his/her emotional expressiveness or
inexpressiveness.”32 Following from a study by Maureen Mileski,
who described four types of judicial interactions with people
appearing in their courts (good-natured, bureaucratic, firm or
formal, and harsh), Ptacek added a fifth for his study, conde-
scending or patronizing authority.
Battered women, in rating the impact of judicial demeanor on
their experiences, believed the “good-natured” judges were the
only ones who responded appropriately to their desire for affir-
mation of their experiences, their need for safety, and their appeal
for justice.  Good-natured judicial demeanor was defined by the
researchers as “courteous, welcoming, supportive,” where judges
used their authority to make the women feel welcome, to express
concern for their suffering, and to mobilize resources on their
behalf.  Surprisingly, battered women felt as unsupported by
judges who were attempting to be “neutral” (bureaucratic, pas-
sive, or detached) as they did by judges who behaved in conde-
scending and harsh manners toward them, believing all were
unconcerned about their fears and, ultimately, their lives.
Judicial demeanor also has an impact on abusers.  A judge’s
response to inappropriate behavior on the part of the batterer
tells him whether he will be able to continue his manipulation of
the people in his environment, or that he will be held account-
able.   Treatment providers affirm the importance of swift and
sure consequences for men who batter as an essential part of
their rehabilitation process.
CONCLUSION
Courts are asked to make decisions that profoundly affect the
safety and security of our nation’s families.  While previously
domestic violence was seen as a private matter, it has entered the
purview of our court system and is prevalent in contested divorce
and parenting responsibility matters.  As such, it is crucial that
the legal system, as well as the mental health system, have suffi-
cient awareness of the dynamics of domestic violence within a
particular family and the impact that such has on the victim,
abuser, and most importantly, the children.  Domestic violence
has a profound and damaging effect on children.  This negative
impact can be somewhat mediated by outside influences, such as
the response of law enforcement officers and the courts in their
handling of these situations.  The societal impact on the child can
be substantial. If a child or family is discouraged from separating
from their abuser or a child is not believed or ignored after dis-
closing the domestic violence, feelings of shame, humiliation,
and helplessness can grow.
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Firearms and domestic violence are a deadly combination.As the examples on the following page show,1 abusers whogain access to firearms pose a lethal threat both to those
they have abused and to the wider community.  Even where
laws exist to disarm abusers and prevent them from purchasing
new firearms, absent effective implementation of the laws—by
judges, as well as by others in the civil and criminal justice sys-
tem—survivors of domestic violence and the broader commu-
nity continue to remain at risk of death or serious injury.
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The statistics regarding domestic violence in this country
are startling.  The United States Department of Justice and oth-
ers have estimated that each year at least one million violent
crimes are committed against persons by their current or for-
mer spouses or dating partners.2 People of all ages and all gen-
der, ethnic, cultural, and demographic backgrounds are
abused, but statistically the largest number are young women
between the ages of 16 and 24.3 Overall, the vast majority of
victims of intimate partner violence are women.4
Studies and experience show that the time of leaving a rela-
tionship can be the most dangerous for a survivor, a phenom-
enon that is often referred to as “separation violence.”  The act
of separating—whether through divorce, by physical or legal
separation, or by ending a dating relationship—often triggers
an escalation of the violence.5 In fact, prior abuse and separa-
tion, or announced plans to separate, appear to be the biggest
risk factors indicating that the abuser will seriously injure or
kill the survivor.6
Judges need to understand this phenomenon because many
survivors, in the course of separating from their abusers, seek
recourse through the legal system; they may seek a protection
order or call law enforcement personnel to initiate a criminal
prosecution.  Because these acts of separation are intended to
wrest control away from the abuser, they typically will be per-
ceived as a significant threat, and the abuser will react by tak-
ing steps to re-exert control over the survivor.  The abuser—
even if there has been limited documented evidence of abuse
in the relationship—may take extreme measures to reestablish
control.  In some instances, the abuser will choose homicide as
the ultimate exercise of power over the victim.
If the abuser has access to a firearm, it is far more likely that
homicide will indeed be the result.  Research shows that fam-
ily and intimate partner assaults involving firearms are 12
times more likely to result in death than those that do not
involve firearms.7 Approximately two-thirds of the intimate
partner homicides in this country are committed using guns.8
In cases in which the abuser’s use of a firearm does not
result in death, the survivor instead may suffer a brutal, life-
altering injury.  A recent study of survivors of severe battering
described such cases, including one in which the abuser
“essentially shot off [the survivor’s] leg—what was left of it had
to be amputated—as she pleaded for her life.” 9
Abusers who kill their intimate partners also may injure or
kill third parties.  One study found that in 38 percent of homi-
cides involving intimate partners the perpetrator kills more
than one person; other victims include children, intervenors,
and bystanders.10
JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Each year, judges across the country issue many thousands
of civil protection orders.  These orders, entered after the court
has found evidence of abuse, are designed to protect the sur-
vivor from further acts of abuse, including assaults, threats,
harassment, and destruction of property.  As described more
fully below, judges in most states are authorized to include in
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their protection orders provisions that deny a respondent
access to firearms.  Additionally, some state laws authorize
removal of firearms in misdemeanor cases of domestic vio-
lence, including at the time of bail, arraignment, or conviction.
Over the past decade, judges have received unprecedented
training about domestic violence.  Often missing from the cur-
riculum, however, has been the issue of firearms, and how the
surrender, return, or denial of firearms is related to domestic
violence civil and criminal cases.  The issue may be ignored
because judges in jurisdictions without state law on the issue
believe that it is federal law, and they needn’t worry about that,
or because judges have philosophical differences of opinion
about the propriety or efficacy of state and federal laws on the
subject.  Whatever the reason, judges will be unable to fulfill
their judicial responsibilities if they do not educate themselves
about the various restrictions that Congress and state legisla-
tures have enacted to limit certain defendants’ access to
firearms in order to promote public safety and prevent death
and severe injuries in domestic abuse cases.
The specific requirements regarding removal of firearms
under state and federal law will be discussed in detail below.
In some cases, removal is discretionary; in others, it is manda-
tory.  It is crucial for judges to understand the circumstances
under which state and federal laws provide that firearms must
be removed.  However, judges should also be sensitive to the
rationale behind provisions for discretionary removal and
ensure that, at the very least, they conduct an appropriate col-
loquy from the bench in the event firearms are not removed.
Given the safety issues discussed above, survivors and the
public at large may be at considerable risk if abusers retain
access to firearms, even under circumstances where removal is
discretionary.  Consequently, the decision to allow an abuser to
retain firearms should be made only after careful consideration
of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
This article is intended to provide judges with an overview
of the state and federal laws that address domestic violence and
firearms.  Because knowledge of the governing laws alone is
insufficient to enable judges to take meaningful steps to safe-
guard survivors and the community, we also provide several
examples of good judicial practices that can facilitate effective
implementation and enforcement of the laws.  We hope that
judges around the country, irrespective of the unique features
of their jurisdictions’ laws, can integrate these prudent prac-
tices into their daily work.
THE APPLICABLE LAWS
Laws at both the state and federal levels prohibit abusers and
stalkers from possessing firearms and ammunition.  Many
states have enacted laws that specifically authorize judges to
prohibit firearm possession or to order seizure of illegally pos-
sessed firearms under certain circumstances, such as where an
abuser used or threatened to use a firearm during an incident
of abuse or where the abuser is subject to an active protection
order.  At the federal level, recently enacted provisions of the
Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., prohibit firearm pos-
session by abusers who are subject to an order of protection sat-
isfying certain requirements or who have been convicted of a
qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.  These
state and federal laws reflect a growing understanding and con-
sensus among the voting public and their elected representa-
tives that abusers present a heightened threat to survivors when
they have access to a firearm.
In this section, we present an overview of the firearm prohi-
bitions enforceable by judges under state law, followed by a dis-
cussion of the federal firearm laws relating to domestic violence.
Then, before turning to an examination of the recommended
judicial practices regarding firearm laws and domestic violence,
we explore the sometimes confusing relationship between the
state and federal firearm laws, as well as the roles and responsi-
bilities of state court judges regarding their enforcement.
State Laws
Over the past several years, state legislatures throughout
the country have enacted laws that restrict domestic violence
perpetrators’ access to firearms and ammunition.  Not surpris-
ingly, the states have taken a wide variety of approaches to the
issue, some imposing mandatory prohibitions on certain
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July 2001: A man attempting to purchase a gun fills out the
required federal form so that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation can complete a criminal background check.
During the check, the FBI determines that the purchaser is
subject to a protection order that may prohibit him from pur-
chasing the gun under federal law.  The records do not indi-
cate, however, whether the required relationship between the
purchaser and the protected person exists.  Despite contact-
ing the court that issued the protection order, the clerk of
court’s office, the sheriff’s office, and the police department
in the issuing jurisdiction, the FBI cannot obtain the neces-
sary information within the requisite three-business-day
period and the gun shop is able to sell the gun to the pur-
chaser.  One hour later, the purchaser uses the gun to mur-
der the person who obtained the protection order, his former
live-in girlfriend.  The FBI learns too late that the transaction
was illegal under federal law.
December 2001: On Christmas Day, a man murders his wife
and 13-year-old daughter with a firearm.  He was able to pur-
chase the gun without a criminal background check because
he possessed a concealed weapon permit that had been
issued several years earlier by a state court.  A few months
before the murders, the very court that granted the permit
had issued a protection order against the murderer and had
arraigned him on domestic battery charges.  The protection
order disqualified the murderer from purchasing or possess-
ing a firearm, but the court never revoked the concealed
weapon permit and the protection order had not been
entered into any registry.  The murdered wife and daughter
were the protected parties on the protection order.
January 2002: A man shoots and kills a law school dean and
injures others.  The killer had been arrested on charges of
domestic battery in August 2001 and had been released with-
out bail conditions restricting firearm possession.  The gun
used in the murder was found with the gun store tags intact.
THE RISKS ARE REAL
offenders and others leav-
ing the power to disarm
offenders largely to the
court’s discretion.  This sec-
tion provides a brief
overview of the types of
firearm prohibitions that
have been enacted by the
states, including both those
enforceable by civil-court
judges and those enforce-
able by judges who hear
criminal matters.
Civil System
In at least nine states, entry of a civil domestic violence
protection order meeting certain criteria subjects the respon-
dent to a mandatory prohibition on the possession of
firearms.11 For instance, Florida law prohibits possession of a
firearm or ammunition by a person subject to a valid final pro-
tection order that enjoins that person from committing acts of
domestic violence,12 while New Hampshire law requires relin-
quishment of firearms and ammunition by a respondent if the
court finds that the respondent represents a credible threat to
the safety of the survivor.13 In states that have a mandatory
prohibition, judges do not have any discretion over whether
the prohibition applies; in some instances, however, a specific
finding may be required to trigger the prohibition under state
law.
A more common approach is to give judges issuing civil pro-
tection orders the discretion to include a provision prohibiting
firearm possession within the order.14 In a few states, such pro-
visions may be included in both temporary, ex parte protection
orders and in final orders entered after the respondent has had
an opportunity to be heard.  Some states also authorize judges
to include a prohibition against purchasing or otherwise acquir-
ing a firearm for the duration of a protection order.15
Some states, recognizing that an abuser who possesses a
license or permit to carry firearms may be able to circumvent a
state or federal law firearm prohibition by evading a back-
ground check, authorize judges to order the respondent to sur-
render the permit or license for the duration of a protection
order.16 For instance, under New York law the court is
required to suspend any existing license possessed by the
respondent and to order the respondent ineligible for such a
license upon issuance of a protection order if the court finds
that the conduct that led to issuance of the order involved the
infliction of serious physical injury, the use or threatened use
of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or behavior con-
stituting a violent felony.17
Some of the firearm prohibitions described above are sub-
ject to exceptions intended to allow law enforcement officers
to possess firearms despite being subject to an order that
would otherwise disqualify a respondent from possession.  For
instance, the mandatory firearm prohibition imposed by
Wisconsin law against a person subject to a domestic violence
restraining order does not apply to peace officers if they are
required to possess a firearm while on or off duty.18 As dis-
cussed more fully below, one of the federal statutes that pro-
hibits firearm possession is also subject to an exception for law
enforcement officers and military personnel.
Criminal System
Judges hearing criminal matters in many states also have
legal authority to deny domestic violence perpetrators access
to firearms.  Depending on the state, the prohibition may be
imposed as a bail or other condition of release, or it may be
included as a probation condition.  In some states, a firearm
prohibition is a mandatory condition imposed on all defen-
dants charged with a domestic violence crime.19 In other
states, a firearm prohibition is highly favored and must be
imposed absent a special finding by the judge.20 In still other
states, a prohibition is required only if the judge makes certain
findings regarding the likelihood that the defendant will use a
firearm in further acts of violence.21
Upon conviction of a domestic violence crime, defendants
in many states become subject to a firearm prohibition,
although in some cases a firearm must have been used in the
offense.22 In most cases, the prohibition is mandatory, but at
least one state (Minnesota) makes the prohibition discre-
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firearm prohibition
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11. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, §
1448(a) (2002); FLA. STAT. CH. 790.233 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §
134-7(2002); MD. CODE ANN., ART. 27, § 445(d)(2)(v) (2002);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 173-B:5 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:4(A)
(2002); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-7 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2002).
12. See FLA. STAT. CH. 790.233 (2002).
13. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 173-B:5 (2002).
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IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(c)(4) (2002); MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 4-506(d)(12) (2002); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 600.2950(1)(e)
(2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201 (2002); N.J. REV. STAT. §§
2C:25-28, 2C:25-29(16) (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866 (2002);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105(c)(6) (2002); TEX. FAM. CODE §
85.022(e) (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.2 (2002); W. VA.
CODE § 48-27-403 (2002).
15. In states that do not explicitly authorize firearm removal as part of
a protection order, judges may be able to use the “catch-all” relief
provision available in many protection order codes to order that
the respondent not possess firearms for the duration of the order.
16. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 209A, § 3C (2002); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 842-a(1)-(2) (2002); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(A)(7)
(2002); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.187 (2002).
17. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842-a(1)-(2) (2002).
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(2002).
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tionary and requires that the court make written findings to
support an order not to possess firearms.23
Federal Laws
Congress has also recognized the importance of restricting
domestic violence abusers’ access to firearms.  In 1994, along
with the passage of the original Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA),24 Congress enacted the first federal legislation to
address this issue directly.  The new law, which amended the
Gun Control Act of 1968 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. section
922(g)(8), makes it a federal crime for a person who is subject
to a qualifying protection order to possess a firearm or ammu-
nition, or to ship or receive a firearm or ammunition in inter-
state or foreign commerce.  To qualify under section 922(g)(8),
a protection order must:
(1) have been issued after a hearing of which the respondent
received actual notice, and at which the respondent had an
opportunity to participate;
(2) restrain the respondent from harassing, stalking, or threat-
ening an intimate partner of the respondent or child of
such intimate partner or the respondent, or engaging in
other conduct that would place an intimate partner in rea-
sonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(3) either include a finding that the respondent represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate part-
ner or child or by its terms explicitly prohibit the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury.25
The federal law defines the term “intimate partner” for pur-
poses of section 922(g)(8) as a spouse or former spouse of the
respondent, a person who is a parent of the child of the respon-
dent, or a person who cohabits or has cohabited with the
respondent.26
Provided that these requirements have been satisfied, mere
possession of a firearm or ammunition will subject a defendant
to prosecution under section 922(g)(8).  The order itself need
not prohibit possession of firearms, and the respondent need
not have violated the order itself in any way.  The federal law
does, however, require that the possession be “knowing” to
support a prosecution.27 Section 922(g)(8) applies only for the
duration of the qualifying protection order.
In addition to section 922(g)(8), the 1994 amendments to
the Gun Control Act included 18 U.S.C. section 922(d)(8),
which makes it a federal crime to sell or transfer a firearm or
ammunition to a person knowing or having reasonable cause
to believe that the person is
subject to a qualifying pro-
tection order.  The same
requirements discussed
above in reference to sec-
tion 922(g)(8) apply to
protection orders under
section 922(d)(8).28 The
intent behind section
922(d)(8) takes on special
significance for state court
judges when respondents
petition a court for the
return of guns that have
been seized pursuant to
state or federal law.  If the
court knows or has reason-
able cause to believe that
the respondent is subject to
an active protection order that satisfies section 922(d)(8) (as
where a criminal court is petitioned for return of weapons but
is aware of a qualifying protection order issued by a sister civil
court), it should not return the firearms.  As described more
fully below, good judicial practice would be to search, prior to
returning any firearms, all available records to determine
whether a person is subject to a firearms disqualification under
state or federal law.
A limited exception to sections 922(g)(8) and 922(d)(8)
exists for law enforcement officers, armed forces personnel,
and other local, state, and federal employees who are required
to use weapons as part of their official duties.  Under 18 U.S.C.
section 925(a)(1), sometimes referred to as the “official-use
exemption,” the prohibitions in sections 922(g)(8) and
922(d)(8) do not apply to firearms that are received or pos-
sessed by such individuals for use in performing official duties
on behalf of a federal, state, or local agency.  Personal weapons,
however, are not covered by the exemption.29
In 1996, Congress enacted the second important amend-
ment to the Gun Control Act related to domestic violence.
Known as the “Lautenberg Amendment,” the new law added
persons who have been convicted of certain misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence to the list of those barred by the
federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms and
ammunition.  The prohibition, found at 18 U.S.C. section
922(g)(9), has been particularly controversial because it
applies to misdemeanors and does not include an official-use
exemption for law enforcement and military personnel.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, to Charles Higgenbotham, International Association of
Chiefs of Police (Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with authors); see also
National Instant Criminal Background Check Program, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding
Federal Firearms Prohibitions Resulting from Protection Orders, 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(8), and Misdemeanor Crimes of Domestic Violence,
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), Presentation to the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, at 5 (July 16, 2002) [here-
inafter NICS Frequently Asked Questions].
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who have been 
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crimes of domestic
violence to the list
of those barred by
the federal law
from purchasing or
possessing firearms
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Despite several court chal-
lenges, section 922(g)(9) has
withstood judicial scrutiny and
remains good law.
Which misdemeanor crimes
qualify under section 922(g)(9)?
The definition of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence
requires that the offense be a
misdemeanor under federal or
state law and have, as an ele-
ment, the use or attempted use
of physical force or the threat-
ened use of a deadly weapon.30
In addition, a misdemeanor con-
viction qualifies only if one of the enumerated relationships
exists between the perpetrator and the victim of the crime.
Specifically, the perpetrator must be a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim; a person who shares a child in
common with the victim; a person who is cohabiting or has
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian; or a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim.31
The federal law also imposes two due-process-related
requirements, namely that the perpetrator must have been rep-
resented by counsel (or have knowingly and intelligently
waived that right) and that if the perpetrator was entitled to a
jury trial, either the case was tried by a jury or the perpetrator
knowingly and intelligently waived that right.32
It is important to note that only a “conviction” triggers the
section 922(g)(9) prohibition.  The variety of state court prac-
tices employed to streamline the criminal judicial process can
make it difficult to discern whether an adjudication is indeed a
“conviction” as required by the federal law.  The problem often
arises where some form of delayed adjudication is available to
state courts, as where an “adjournment in contemplation of dis-
missal” may be entered.33 By regulation, the question of
whether a qualifying “conviction” exists is made by reference to
the governing state law: if the form of adjudication is consid-
ered a conviction under state law, it will qualify as a “convic-
tion” and support prosecution under section 922(g)(9).34 In
many, if not most, circumstances, a delayed adjudication will
not be considered a conviction under state law, so to the extent
judges accept such pleas they should keep in mind that one of
the collateral consequences is that the federal firearm prohibi-
tion may not apply against the perpetrator.
Although section 922(g)(9) imposes a lifetime ban on
firearm possession following a qualifying misdemeanor convic-
tion, the statute does provide that firearm possession rights
may be restored under limited circumstances.  Specifically, the
conviction must be “expunged or set aside” or it must be “an
offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides
for the loss of civil rights under such offense).”35
Federal courts have consistently held that section 922(g)(9)
applies to misdemeanor convictions that occurred prior to the
1996 enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment.  The courts
have rejected challenges based upon the Ex Post Facto clause
of the U.S. Constitution, ruling that so long as the illegal act of
firearm possession occurs after the enactment date, the law
does not retrospectively punish acts that were legal prior to the
enactment date.36
Unlike section 922(g)(8), section 922(g)(9) is not subject to
the “official-use exemption” for law enforcement and military
personnel.37 Consequently, a law enforcement officer or mem-
ber of the military who has been convicted of a qualifying mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence is subject to a lifetime
ban on firearm possession, including possession of official-duty
weapons.  Thus, departments may need to terminate or reas-
sign officers who become subject to the ban.38
As part of the Lautenberg Amendment, Congress also
enacted 18 U.S.C. section 922(d)(9), which prohibits the sale
or transfer of a firearm or ammunition to a person if the trans-
feror knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the person
has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence.39 The definition of misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence is the same as that which applies to section 922(g)(9).40
Challenges to the Federal Firearm Laws
The federal firearm statutes related to domestic violence
have withstood an onslaught of legal challenges in virtually
every federal circuit.  Defendants have sought to overturn their
convictions using a plethora of legal theories, including several
constitutional challenges.  To date, the federal courts have
rejected every such challenge, and the statutes remain on solid
legal ground.
Defendants have repeatedly invoked the notice and due
process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
36 Court Review - Summer 2002
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A) (2002).
31. See id. That is not to say that the criminal offense must be named
“domestic assault” or “spousal abuse,” or even that it have as an
element the requisite relationship between the perpetrator and
the victim; rather, to qualify under the federal law one of the enu-
merated relationships must have existed in fact.  See, e.g., United
States v. Meade, 175 F. 3d 215, 218-221 (1st Cir. 1999).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(i) (2002).
33. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 315.3(2002).
34. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.11.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(ii).  In addition, if the pardon, expunge-
ment, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the per-
son may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms, then the
restriction against firearms possession continues.  See id.
36. See, e.g., United Sates v. Mitchell, 209 F. 3d 319, 322-23 (4th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 849 (2000).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (specifically excluding sections
922(g)(9) and 922(d)(9)).
38. See John W. Magaw, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Open Letter to All
State and Local Law Enforcement Officials” (visited August 20,
2002), available at http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/
opltrleo.htm.
39. Therefore, a court should not authorize the return of a firearm to
a person that the court knows or has reasonable cause to believe
has been convicted of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domes-
tic violence.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(33).
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to attack the constitutionality of both 18 U.S.C. sections
922(g)(8) and (g)(9).  Without exception, the federal courts
have ruled that even if a defendant was unaware of the exis-
tence of the federal law, the “ignorance of the law is no excuse”
doctrine governs.41 Thus, while it may be good judicial prac-
tice to advise defendants of these laws, such notice is not a
requirement.
Defendants have also contended that the statutes are beyond
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, a challenge that
the courts have rejected because both sections 922(g)(8) and
922(g)(9) include a “jurisdictional element,” namely, the
requirement that the firearm or ammunition must have been
“shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”42
Likewise, Tenth Amendment challenges have failed because the
federal courts have ruled that the statutes are federal criminal
statutes that are to be implemented by federal authorities, not
state authorities, and so they neither “commandeer” state gov-
ernments into serving federal purposes nor implicate the states’
rights to regulate domestic relations.43
The Second Amendment provided the basis for the most
highly publicized challenge to the federal firearm statutes since
their enactment.  In 1998, Dr. Timothy Joe Emerson was
indicted in a Texas federal district court for possession of
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8).44 Dr.
Emerson had purchased a firearm while he was subject to a
protection order issued by a Texas state court that prohibited
him from harming or threatening to harm his wife or the cou-
ple’s four-year-old daughter.  Dr. Emerson, who was arrested
after he allegedly brandished the firearm in front of his wife and
daughter, moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting among
other things that section 922(g)(8) violates the Second
Amendment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss,
finding that the Second Amendment recognizes an individual
right to own and possess firearms and concluding that section
922(g)(8) was unconstitutional because it criminalizes pro-
tected conduct based upon a state civil court order with no par-
ticularized findings.45
The district court decision set the stage for the government’s
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  In a
lengthy decision, two of the three judges on the panel that
heard the appeal agreed with the district court that the Second
Amendment confers on individuals the right to bear arms.46 In
so doing, the majority departed from the conclusion reached by
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every other federal appellate
court to decide the question.47
The Emerson majority did, how-
ever, uphold the constitutional-
ity of section 922(g)(8) as
applied to Emerson, finding that
the law is a sufficiently “limited,
narrowly tailored specific excep-
tion or restriction” to the
Second Amendment right.48
Emerson subsequently appealed
the decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari
on June 10, 2002.49
The National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS)
In 1993, Congress enacted a new law intended to prevent
prohibited persons from purchasing firearms from dealers.
That law, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady
Act),50 requires all federally licensed gun dealers to obtain a
criminal background check of all purchasers before completing
a sale.  In most cases, the required background check is to be
made using the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System, or “NICS,” which comprises several computer data-
bases managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.51
Among other things, the FBI search includes an examination of
the federal database that contains information about state-
court-issued protection orders (the National Crime
Information Center Protection Order File) and state criminal
history records.  During the course of the background check,
the FBI conducts a search to determine whether the sale of the
firearm would violate any applicable state or federal laws.52 By
statute, the FBI search is limited to three business days; if no
state or federal prohibitions are uncovered within that period,
the sale is allowed to proceed by default.53
In theory, the NICS background check should prevent an
abuser who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under state
or federal law from buying one from a licensed gun dealer.  In
practice, the system is imperfect, and a disconcertingly large
number of abusers have been able to obtain a firearm in viola-
tion of federal law because the FBI could not complete its
investigation within three business days.54 There are, however,
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kafka, 222 F. 3d 1129, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
2000) (and cases cited therein); Mitchell, supra note 36, at 323-
24 (and cases cited therein).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Napier, 233 F. 3d 394, 399-402 (6th Cir.
2000) (and cases cited therein).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 231 F. 3d 508, 515 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Wilson, 159 F. 3d 280, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1998).
44. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F. 3d 203, 211-12 (5th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (June 10, 2002).
45. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex.
1999).
46. See Emerson, supra note 44, at 218-260.
47. See, e.g., Napier, supra note 42, at 402-04 (and cases cited
therein).
48. Emerson, supra note 44, at 260-64.
49. Emerson v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
50. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
51. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 25.  FBI personnel do not perform all NICS back-
ground checks.  In some states, a state or local law enforcement
agency has been designated a “point of contact” (POC) and is
responsible for conducting the check.  See 28 C.F.R. §§ 25.2,
25.6(d).
52. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.6.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(B)(ii).
54. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Gun Control: Opportunities to
Close Loopholes in the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System(GAO-02-653), at 17-23 (July 2002) [hereinafter GAO
Report].
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instance, some judges are under the misimpression that they
can “over-ride” the operation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8)
simply by not checking the appropriate space on a protection
order form, or by including language in the order to the effect
that the federal law does not apply against the respondent.
In fact, section 922(g)(8) does not rely upon state law defi-
nitions or standards to determine whether a person is prohib-
ited from possessing a firearm.  Rather, the question of whether
a protection order issued by a state court triggers the section
922(g)(8) prohibition is determined solely by reference to the
specific requirements of the federal statute.  In practice, this
means that the particular findings and terms of the order must
be assessed against the federal requirements enumerated in sec-
tion 922(g)(8), and inquiry must be made into whether the fed-
eral notice and hearing requirements were satisfied. 
Thus, an otherwise qualifying protection order will still trig-
ger the federal prohibition even if the issuing judge rules that
the respondent is entitled to possess a firearm under state law,
or if the judge fails to note on the order that the federal prohi-
bition would apply (for example, by failing to mark a box on
the form that indicates application of the federal prohibition).
Simply put, state court judges do not determine the applicabil-
ity of the federal law.56
All of this is not to say, however, that the actions of state
court judges do not profoundly affect the operation of the fed-
eral law.  In fact, the nature of the conduct proscribed by the
order or of the findings of fact included therein determines
whether the federal law applies.  For instance, by ensuring that
their orders hew to the specific requirements of section
922(g)(8) (that is, that they contain the requisite findings or
prohibitory language or both), judges can facilitate subsequent
enforcement of the federal firearm laws.  In addition, judges
can promote the deterrent effect of the federal law by providing
the respondent with both written and oral notice that they will
be in violation of section 922(g)(8) if they possess or purchase
a firearm while the protection order is in effect.  By indicating
on the order the relationship between the parties as well as the
order’s compliance with the due process requirements of sec-
tion 922(g)(8), judges can also make it clear that a protection
order triggers the federal prohibition.  Other practical steps that
state court judges can take to facilitate enforcement of section
922(g)(8) and the other federal laws are described in further
detail below.
Full Faith and Credit and Firearm Prohibitions in
Protection Orders
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 included provi-
sions requiring the interjurisdictional enforcement of protec-
tion orders.  Codified at 18 U.S.C. sections 2265 and 2266,
these “full faith and credit” provisions of VAWA require states
and Indian tribes to enforce protection orders issued in other
jurisdictions as if they had been issued by the enforcing state or
some practical steps that
judges can and should take
to improve the speed and
accuracy of the FBI investi-
gation.  Doing so would sig-
nificantly increase the likeli-
hood that their protection
orders and judgments of
conviction will be enforced
and that community and
survivor safety will be
enhanced.  These steps are discussed in detail below.
State Judges’ Role with Respect to Federal Firearm Laws
What is the relationship between the federal and state
firearm laws, and to what extent do state court judges play a
role in the enforcement of the federal laws?  Those questions are
the source of considerable confusion among members of the
bench and bar throughout the country.
Perhaps the most common misunderstanding about the rela-
tionship between the federal and state firearm prohibitions
arises when the two sets of laws address similar situations but
differ significantly in their approach.  For instance, we have
seen that under the federal Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)), a person subject to a domestic violence protection
order meeting specific statutory criteria is not permitted to pos-
sess a firearm while the order is in effect.  By contrast, many
states impose such a ban only if the issuing court exercises its
discretion to prohibit firearm possession as part of the order’s
terms and conditions.  In such a state, the question arises
whether a respondent legally can possess a firearm when the
order does not include a state-law firearm prohibition yet oth-
erwise satisfies the federal Gun Control Act requirements.  In
more formal legal terms, some judges wonder whether the fed-
eral law, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
preempts or supercedes the state law.
In fact, this is neither a situation that triggers the Supremacy
Clause nor one that enables the state court judge to abrogate the
federal firearm laws.  Rather, both sets of laws remain in full
force and both apply to this situation.  The respondent would
not be subject to a state-law firearm prohibition, because the
judge opted not to invoke her authority to prohibit gun posses-
sion, but the respondent nonetheless would be subject to fed-
eral prosecution under the federal gun law, because the federal
prohibition is independent of state law.  This analysis holds true
for all of the federal firearm statutes discussed above.55
Confusion also arises over a state court judge’s role in the
enforcement of the 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8) prohibition when
it is a state court order of protection that triggers the federal law.
Especially in states where the protection order form provides a
space for the issuing judge to indicate whether the federal pro-
hibitions apply, some judges misunderstand their role.  For
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55. See NICS Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 29, at 1-2.
56. In fact, when FBI personnel conduct the NICS background check
on a potential firearm purchaser and find that a protection order
has been issued against the purchaser, they are required to per-
form an independent analysis to determine whether the order
triggers 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and do not rely upon state author-
ities’ determinations.  Personal communication with Fanny L.
Haslebacher, Senior Attorney, National Instant Criminal
Background Check Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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tribe, provided certain jurisdictional and due process require-
ments are met.57 That mandate applies to firearm restrictions
in protection orders and requires that such restrictions be
enforced even if the enforcing jurisdiction does not authorize
judges to include a firearm prohibition in a protection order.
Judges must be aware that violation of a firearm prohibition
in an out-of-jurisdiction protection order can be the basis of a
prosecution in the enforcing jurisdiction, using whatever
enforcement mechanism is applied to violations of orders
issued within that jurisdiction.  Even if the protected party
would not have been eligible for the order in the enforcing
jurisdiction, and even if the duration of the order exceeds the
maximum duration allowed for orders issued in the enforcing
jurisdiction, VAWA mandates enforcement of the foreign order,
including any firearm provisions.58
EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PRACTICE
Having a clear understanding of the law is essential to good
judicial practice.  It is also helpful to look at some specific
examples that judges confront in courtrooms on a regular basis.
The following are judicial practices that can help safeguard the
community.  By taking some simple steps in the courtroom and
by encouraging clerks of court and other court personnel to
ensure that relevant information is gathered and conveyed to
the appropriate agencies, judges can do much to facilitate the
effective operation of the state and federal laws described
above.  While we recognize that state law and procedures vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the following should be of
general applicability, regardless of a jurisdiction’s idiosyn-
crasies.
Question the Parties About Firearms
Judges should take every opportunity to ask about the pres-
ence of firearms when issues of domestic violence are pre-
sented.  All court forms that relate to civil and criminal domes-
tic violence cases should have questions regarding the presence
and possession of firearms.  In the civil arena, such forms
include applications for a civil protection order, ex parte and
final protection order forms, requests for extension or renewal
of an order, and requests to vacate or dismiss an order.  In crim-
inal cases, they include bail or condition-of-release orders,
arraignment forms, and disposition orders.  The court should
inquire at each stage of the civil process whether the defendant
owns or has access to firearms—an inquiry that should be
made at both the ex parte hearing and at the hearing on the
merits (final hearing).  The petitioner may not know if the
respondent has firearms, or may be aware of only some of the
weapons.  Therefore, judges should obtain from the respon-
dent, under oath, a list of all firearms to help ensure that all are
relinquished at the final hearing.
Such an inquiry is espe-
cially important at the final
hearing if firearms were not
removed at the ex parte stage,
whether because state law
does not permit removal at
that stage, because the court
did not so order, or because
the defendant did not have
any firearms at the time.  To
reassert control over the sur-
vivor or to seek revenge, a
respondent subject to a pro-
tection order may attempt to
acquire a firearm after being served with a protection order.  If
the temporary order did not include a prohibition against pos-
session, the respondent may have legally obtained a firearm59
and now may pose a significant threat to the survivor’s safety.
Inquiry on the criminal side is equally important.  At the bail
hearing or arraignment, as well as upon a conviction, the court
should inquire and have defendants state under oath those
firearms that they own or have in their possession.  This infor-
mation will facilitate both the entry of a specific removal order
and law enforcement’s retrieval of the firearms.  The court
should remember that if the conviction is a qualifying misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence under federal law, 18 U.S.C.
section 922(g)(9) prohibits possession of firearms.  If state law
permits removal, the judge should order it; if not, the judge
should notify defendants of the federal law and their responsi-
bility to dispossess themselves of any firearms.
Understand the Nuances of “Possession”
As previously explained, under federal law and many state
laws, an abuser may not, upon issuance of a civil protection
order or conviction of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, “possess” firearms.  Frequently abusers will
report having “sold” their firearms to a friend or relative, coin-
cidentally just at the time of the domestic violence incident.
The court must determine whether this is a bona fide sale, and
should request proof of the transaction.  If it was a fraudulent
transfer, further action may be warranted.
Another scenario is where the abuser transfers possession of
firearms to friends or family members, feeling that this may
help ensure retrieval at the end of the case.  Such a scenario
raises questions of “constructive possession.”60 If a respondent
can ask for, or physically retrieve without barrier, any of the
firearms transferred to a third party, such action may not con-
stitute the requisite relinquishment.  A respondent who has
constructive possession of firearms has the opportunity to use
them, which is an action expressly prohibited by law.  A court
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57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)-(b).
58. Specific questions regarding VAWA’s full faith and credit provi-
sions may be directed to the National Center on Full Faith and
Credit at (800) 256-5883, ext. 2.
59. Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not apply to ex parte pro-
tection orders because it requires that the order have been issued
after a hearing of which the respondent received actual notice and
at which the respondent had an opportunity to participate.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Quilling, 261 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir.
2001) (defining “constructive possession” in a federal Gun Control
Act case as existing when “a person . . . knowingly has the power
and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control
over an object, either directly, or through others,” and affirming
conviction based upon constructive, but not actual, possession).
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61. In addition, judges considering whether to enter a deferred adju-
dication order (e.g., an adjournment in contemplation of dis-
missal) should conduct a dangerousness assessment and, if appro-
priate and permitted by state law, impose as a condition that the
defendant not possess firearms.
62. As explained above, however, notice of the federal firearm prohi-
bitions is not necessary to support a conviction.  See supra note
41 and accompanying text.
should order that all such
firearms be truly relin-
quished, for instance, to a
law enforcement agency.
A related scenario is
presented when a respon-
dent, who has been
removed from the joint res-
idence with the survivor,
moves into his parents’
home where access to
firearms is available
(whether they are the
respondent’s own weapons
that he “sold” to them or
gave to them for safekeeping, or they are his parents’
weapons).  The court should consider ordering relinquishment
of such weapons to law enforcement, especially if they are
owned by the respondent.
Another possibility to consider under such circumstances is
to have an arrangement with the federal authorities responsi-
ble for enforcing the federal firearm prohibitions, specifically
the assistant United States Attorney assigned to domestic vio-
lence cases and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms.   They may send a letter to the respondent’s relatives
advising them of the federal laws that prohibit granting pos-
session of firearms to those who are disqualified and warning
them of the significant penalties attached to such a conviction.
Of course, if the parents or others who have been asked to hold
the firearms are present in the courtroom, the court may
address them and so note in the record.  In addition, it may be
advisable to have them sign an acknowledgment of receipt of
the court order, and include language to document that they
were made aware of the federal prohibitions and the penalties
that will attach if they allow the respondent access to the
firearms.
Use All Available State and Federal Authority to Disarm
Offenders
In addition to asking about the presence of firearms, judges
should issue appropriate orders that will provide for the safety
of the survivor.  The court should utilize a risk assessment or
“dangerousness” checklist of some type to determine the pro-
priety of removing firearms if such removal is discretionary.
The existence of prior protection orders, threats, firearms
offenses, suicide attempts, and harm to pets are but a few of the
factors that would suggest removal is appropriate, since all are
indicia of potential serious violence.  By the same token, in
criminal cases such an assessment should be conducted at a
hearing to set bail conditions, as well as at arraignment, and, if
the defendant is convicted, as part of the dispositional order
(whether incarceration, probation, parole, etc.).61 The court
should be careful to order relinquishment at all stages where it
is mandatory under state law, including upon issuance of a
protection order or upon conviction of a qualifying offense.
Build Accountability into the Process
Orders do not mean much, and judicial efforts to provide
safety become moot, if an abuser is not made to follow a court
order and, in the process, kills an intimate partner.  In addition
to issuing comprehensive orders, the court has a responsibility
to ensure that orders are followed and that firearms are relin-
quished pursuant to whatever state process exists.
One effective monitoring mechanism used by some courts
is to require that law enforcement provide an accounting to the
court of all firearms removed, based upon the affidavit that the
abuser signs in court.  If an abuser refuses to relinquish the
firearms, or if law enforcement is otherwise unable to obtain
them, the court may, under appropriate circumstances, issue a
search warrant for law enforcement to obtain the guns or a
bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest for failure to comply
with the court order. 
Provide Litigants with Notice of Federal Firearms
Protections and Full Faith and Credit
No one wants surprises in this line of work, least of all sur-
vivors who may be unaware of the protections afforded or even
abusers who may be unaware of the restrictions imposed.  At all
hearings that result in a state or federal firearms prohibition, the
court should explain, on the record, all prohibitions that apply.
Especially where only the federal prohibitions apply, providing
oral and written notice is an important practice. While this may
take a few extra minutes of court time, it offers the opportunity
to clarify any questions the abuser may have, to create a record
of “notice” to the abuser,62 and to send a message, in the pres-
ence of the survivor, that safety is a priority set by the court and
the community.   Perhaps most important, the court can also
use this opportunity to help the survivor to understand that law
enforcement or the prosecutor should contact federal authori-
ties if there is a violation of the federal law.
In addition, the court should advise the parties that under
18 U.S.C. section 2265, VAWA’s full faith and credit provision,
the firearms restrictions will be enforced not only in their own
jurisdiction, but across the country in all jurisdictions.  Thus,
possession of or attempts to purchase firearms in another juris-
diction will be thwarted, just as they will be in the issuing
jurisdiction.  Both survivors and abusers may be unaware that
federal law mandates nationwide enforcement of protection
orders and all of the restrictions therein.
Enter Court Orders into State and Federal Registries
To maximize enforcement of protection orders, it is imper-
ative to enter them immediately into a state protection order
registry, if one exists, and the federal registry maintained by the
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63. See GAO Report, supra note 54. Over the approximately the same
three year period (from Nov. 30, 1998 to Oct. 7, 2001), the NICS
background check blocked almost 200,000 gun purchases by per-
sons who were legally prohibited from possessing a firearm.  Id. at
19 (chart).
64. See id. at 19 (chart).
65. See id. at 18.
66. See id.
FBI (the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Protection
Order File).  Some jurisdictions have an “automatic feed”
mechanism so that a single entry will accomplish both.  In
some locations, court clerks enter the data directly from the
court; in others, a different state agency is responsible for data
entry.  Whoever holds this responsibility should ensure that
forms are completed appropriately so that the orders can be
entered properly and accessed nationwide.  
It is not uncommon for abusers to cross jurisdictional lines
and violate protection orders or commit other offenses.  If pro-
tection orders are not entered in registries, courts and law
enforcement in the new jurisdiction may not be aware of the
firearms prohibitions and may not mandate removal in appro-
priate circumstances (such as when a new victim seeks an order
against the same individual, or the defendant attempts to pur-
chase a weapon and the FBI or law enforcement in the new
jurisdiction cannot locate the protection order in the federal
registry).
To ensure that protection order information can be entered
into the NCIC Protection Order File, the entering agency must
have specific identifying information required by the federal
database.  Of particular importance is the respondent’s numeric
identifier, which may be, among other things, a date of birth,
Social Security number, or driver’s license number and expira-
tion date.  Some opportunities to capture this information arise
at these points in the process: when completing a petition for a
protection order, the survivor can also complete a defendant
information sheet with descriptive information; upon service of
a protection order, law enforcement can ask the respondent for
proof of identity, including a driver’s license that would indicate
a date of birth, or a Social Security card, or, at a minimum, offi-
cers can simply ask the respondent to state such information;
and at the final hearing, the court can ask the respondent to pro-
vide the information prior to the commencement of the hearing.
Obtaining the numeric identifier will greatly facilitate entry
of appropriate orders into the state and federal registries.  This
will not only provide enhanced protection to victims, but can
also help to prevent any inappropriate arrests or detentions
when identifying information is questionable.
Support the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System by Ensuring that Your Court Is Responsive to FBI
Requests for Information
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS) depends on timely, accurate information to prevent
unlawful firearm purchases.  Because the Brady Act allows the
FBI (or an FBI-designated state agency in the case of “point of
contact” states) only three business days to determine whether
there is any reason why an individual should not be able to pur-
chase a firearm, the relevant information needs to be in the
NICS databases or readily available from the originating court
in order for the system to be effective.
In addition to ensuring that
the information from their pro-
tection orders is quickly and
accurately entered into the
NCIC Protection Order File,
judges can facilitate NICS
background checks by being
responsive to requests from the
FBI for information concerning
their orders and final disposi-
tion records.  Unfortunately,
this is not always the case.  The
General Accounting Office’s
recent study of the NICS sys-
tem’s first three years of opera-
tion, from November 1998 to October 2001, revealed that 95%
of the checks were completed within the three business days
allotted.63 The other 5% is troubling, however, because it rep-
resents permitted purchases by thousands of people who were
prohibited by state or federal law from buying a firearm.  In
fact, the GAO found that nearly 3,000 domestic abusers were
able to purchase firearms simply because the FBI was unable to
complete the background check within the time allotted.64
When the FBI later discovers that a sale should not have
been authorized, the agency asks agents from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to retrieve the firearm.  That
procedure, sometimes called a “delayed denial” retrieval, pre-
sents enhanced risks for the law enforcement officers who
must take back guns from an individual who has already
“legally” acquired them.
Significantly, the GAO also found that while 14% of the
almost 200,000 blocked purchases were stopped because the
purchaser had been convicted of a misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence crime, that prohibition accounted for 26% of the delayed
denial retrievals.65 As the GAO noted, this difference is “dis-
proportionately large” and the unlawful purchases present
considerable risk to public safety.66
What exactly is causing this problem?  Simply put, the FBI’s
lack of timely access to complete and accurate information
concerning the purchaser’s criminal history is to blame.
Clearly, the FBI’s ability to perform Brady checks within the
three-day period is impeded when jurisdictions do not enter
their orders into the NCIC Protection Order File, do not
update criminal history information as it becomes available, or,
even less excusably, refuse or delay in responding to the FBI’s
requests for clarifying information.  Each missing piece of
information means additional personnel time devoted to track-
ing it down from the relevant jurisdiction.  Far worse, when
the necessary information is not found quickly enough, a pur-
chase may be allowed by default and, as occurred in the July
2001 case described at the beginning of this article, the abuser
may use the firearm to kill the victim.  Timely entry of such
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data is an important element
in promoting public safety,
especially for an at-risk pop-
ulation.  Judges should take
all steps necessary to ensure
that all relevant information
regarding their orders and
criminal case dispositions is
readily available to the NICS
system and that their court-
houses are responsive to FBI
requests.
Develop a Safe Returns Process
When an abuser petitions for return of firearms because a
civil protection order expires or is dismissed at the request of
the petitioner, or because a qualifying misdemeanor domestic
violence conviction has been expunged, the court should take
all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not authorize return
of the firearms to a person who may nonetheless be disquali-
fied.  A typical example is where a civil protection order expires
after its one-year duration and the survivor, after being noti-
fied, decides not to apply for an extension.  On the basis of
these facts alone, it would appear appropriate to authorize the
return.  However, the same respondent may be subject to a pro-
tection order issued by another court in the same state (poten-
tially even the same court) or in another state, protecting a dif-
ferent victim.  Or the abuser may have previously been con-
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (not
expunged) that triggered a lifetime disqualification from pos-
sessing a firearm. 
The disqualifications follow and flow with the individual
abuser, not the case.  Thus, it is essential that the court perform
a search to determine whether there is any other pending case
or cause that would impose a state or federal firearm prohibi-
tion on the abuser.  It is not enough simply to examine the
pending case.  By so limiting its search, the court may inadver-
tently issue an order instructing a police department to return
a gun to an individual who is legally prohibited from possess-
ing one.
In addition, by providing notice to the survivor that the
abuser has petitioned for a return of firearms, the court may be
able to obtain supplementary information from the survivor
that will assist in determining whether the abuser is a disqual-
ified person.  Of course, notice to survivors will also enable
them to take steps, if necessary, to plan for their own and their
children’s safety in light of the fact that the abuser will soon
regain legal access to firearms. 
A simple and effective procedure to prevent the return of
firearms to disqualified individuals has been implemented in
New Hampshire.  The state statute on protection from abuse
requires the court to conduct a hearing, with notice to the vic-
tim, the defendant, and the relevant law enforcement agency,
before any firearms can be returned.67 The courts and the New
Hampshire Department of Safety have developed a process in
which the defendant completes a motion and affidavit for
return of firearms, tracking the information from the federal
form used for the Brady background check.  The Department
of Safety runs a records check to determine whether there is
any reason the firearms should not be returned to the defen-
dant, including the existence of a disqualifying protection
order, a disqualifying misdemeanor conviction, or any other
disqualifying factor (such as a drug conviction).  If such a rea-
son is found, the defendant is given the opportunity to rebut
the evidence at a hearing.  If no reason is found, the court
issues an order authorizing the return.  The victim is aware of
the petition for return of firearms by virtue of having received
notice.  
This simple process is a good example of collaboration
between agencies and branches of government to promote
public safety.  The New Hampshire Attorney General, the state
coalition against domestic violence, and the state legislature all
recognized the inherent value in such collaboration and
worked together to implement it.
Facilitate the Revocation of Firearm Permits
The GAO’s recent report on the NICS program identified a
threat to survivor and community safety posed by state
firearm-permit programs.  Twenty-six states issue so-called
“conceal carry” permits that exempt the permit holder from a
NICS background check when he or she purchases a firearm.68
In 16 of those states, all such permit holders are exempt from
background checks.69 Although states have procedures for the
revocation of permits when the holder loses eligibility, for
instance, if the holder is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence or becomes subject to a protection order,
there appears to be very little effort to assure that permits are
in fact surrendered.  In its study, the GAO visited six states that
issue conceal carry permits and found that only two actively
seek out permit holders to retrieve revoked permits.  Only one
of the states imposes a criminal penalty against those who do
not surrender revoked permits.70
Absent active monitoring of permit holders and swift recov-
ery of revoked permits, a person with an invalid permit may
nonetheless be able to use it to evade a background check and
purchase a gun.  In fact, that is exactly what happened in the
Christmas Day 2001 slayings described in the first section of
this article.
Judges can facilitate revocation and recovery of conceal
carry permits by ensuring that their orders are transmitted to
the permit authority—be it a court, law enforcement, or
another agency—by entering them into a statewide registry or
by other means.  If the court itself is the permit authority, as
was the case in the Christmas Day murders, judges should
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ensure that a system is put in place to actively monitor permit
holders for potential disqualifying events, including convic-
tions and the entry of protection orders against them.  One
possible monitoring method described in the GAO report
involves electronic comparison of permit holders’ names
against state criminal records databases.71 If authorized by
state law, judges should issue orders requiring permit holders
to surrender revoked permits and use bench warrants to autho-
rize law enforcement to arrest those who fail to comply.
CONCLUSION
Although the phrase may sound trite, domestic violence
and firearms truly can be a lethal combination, endangering
adult and child survivors of abuse as well as the community at
large.  This is not to say that every abuser who owns or pos-
sesses firearms will use them to threaten, kill, or injure others.
Indeed, most do not.  However, the firearm prohibitions
enacted by Congress and the states were designed to be pro-
phylactic, to prevent harm and promote safety under circum-
stances in which reasonable restrictions on firearms possession
are warranted.
State and federal laws concerning firearm relinquishment
for an individual who is subject to a protection order or has
been convicted of certain classes of misdemeanor crimes are
often complex.  We hope this article has helped to clarify the
elements and scope of the federal laws and their relationship to
the analogous state laws.  We also hope judges reading this
article will have learned some useful strategies that they can
incorporate into their daily practice to facilitate compliance
with and enforcement of their orders of protection, as well as
to help ensure effective operation of the applicable state and
federal firearms laws.
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It’s Saturday morning in the Franklin home.* Breakfast is rushedbecause Marty, who is 12 years old, and his sister Rhonda, 9,have early soccer games. Their mother, Donna, is scurrying
around while her husband, Troy, eats and reads the morning paper.
Marty grumbles to his mother, “Ma, hurry up! I told you last week,
the coach picks the starting players 20 minutes before game time.”
His mother snaps back, “If you had washed your uniform last
night like I asked you to, we wouldn’t be in such a hurry.” Rhonda
pipes in, “I did mine.” 
Marty shoots his sister a dirty look and says, “Oh, I guess I just
can’t compete with goody two-shoes here. Hey, maybe my soccer
suit is dirty, but at least I don’t get the Bitch of the Year Award.”
Donna reacts sternly, saying, “Don’t talk that way to your sis-
ter, young man!” Troy now glances up from his paper, annoyed.
“How the hell do you expect Marty to react? If he’s not absolutely
perfect, both of you are all over him.”
“Never mind, Dad,” Marty breaks in flippantly, “I’m used to it.
If one of them isn’t bitching at me, it’s the other.” 
Donna’s blood begins to boil as Troy returns to reading. “Your
son just called me a bitch. You’re his father—you have nothing to
say about it?” Troy half rises out of his seat. “Yeah, I do have
something to say. If you would conduct yourself like an adult,
instead of getting all hysterical, things wouldn’t get like this with
the children. Don’t be so damn sensitive. Marty didn’t call you a
bitch, he said you bitch at him, which is true. You do.”
Marty laughs. Rhonda does too, then immediately feels
ashamed toward her mother and turns red in the face. Their
mother yells loudly at Troy, “It’s not me! You’re the problem here,
you’re just encouraging his bad attitude!”
Troy pounces out of his seat yelling back, “That’s enough out of
you, you goddamned bitch!” Troy then hurls his newspaper to the
floor and shoves Donna hard toward the kitchen door so that she
stumbles and falls. “Get the hell out of here, right now,” he screams,
“or you’ll be sorry!” Donna bursts into tears and runs up to the
bedroom. Marty and Rhonda are left trembling, although Marty
forces a smile and mumbles to Rhonda, “What the hell does Mom
expect?”
The published research on children’s exposure to domestic
violence focuses largely on two aspects of their experience: the
trauma of witnessing physical assaults against their mother,
and the tension produced by living with a high level of conflict
between their parents.1 As important as these factors are, they
reflect only one aspect of many complex problems that typi-
cally pervade the children’s daily lives. The bulk of these diffi-
culties have their roots in the fact that the children are living
with a batterer present in their home. The parenting charac-
teristics commonly observed in batterers have implications for
the children’s emotional and physical well-being, their rela-
tionships with their mothers and siblings, and the develop-
ment of their belief systems. All of these issues need to be
examined in making determinations regarding custody and
visitation in cases involving histories of domestic violence. 
THE BATTERER PROFILE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN
Batterers have been established to have a profile that distin-
guishes them from non-battering men. Each of these identified
characteristics can have an impact on children’s experience and
development. Some of the critical areas that court personnel
should be aware of include:
Control: Coerciveness is widely recognized as a central qual-
ity of battering men.2 It is commonly true that one of the
spheres of the battered woman’s life that is subject to heavy
control by the batterer is her parenting. In some cases, this
control begins even before the children are born, through such
behaviors as the batterer refusing to use birth control, requir-
ing or forbidding the woman to terminate a pregnancy, or caus-
ing her pregnancy through a sexual assault.3 Once children are
born, the batterer may overrule the mother’s parenting deci-
sions, and he may enforce his will by verbally abusing the
mother or physically assaulting her when he is angry about the
children’s behavior or when she does not cede to his parenting
directives,4 as the opening scenario illustrates. Researchers
have found that battered women are far more likely than other
women to feel that they must alter their parenting styles when
their partners are present.5 Thus, children are being raised in
a context where their mother cannot safely use her best judge-
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ment about how to care for them.
Entitlement: Batterers generally have much higher rates than
other men of believing that they are entitled to use violence
toward female partners when they deem it to be necessary,6 and
to take an overall stance in the relationship of claiming supe-
rior status and expecting catering and deference.7 Troy exhibits
his entitlement and sense of superiority by, for example, con-
tributing nothing to the work of a very busy morning and
actively encouraging his son’s negative attitudes toward
females.
Clinical observation indicates that the higher a batterer’s
level of entitlement, the more likely he is to chronically behave
in selfish and self-centered ways. He may, for example, become
irate or violent when he feels that his partner is paying more
attention to the children than to him, which can make it diffi-
cult for the mother to properly meet the children’s physical and
emotional needs. Similarly, he may treat the mother like a ser-
vant in front of the children, so that they learn to disrespect her
and treat her in a similar fashion. In addition, many batterers
cause role reversal in their relationships with their children,
where the children are made to feel responsible to take care of
the battering parent and meet his needs. This can create a bur-
den of parentification for the children, in addition to making
them more vulnerable to sexual abuse.
Manipulation: A batterer commonly is manipulative of fam-
ily members, using such tactics as dishonesty, false promises,
and the sowing of divisions to increase his power and escape
accountability.8 Batterers tend, for example, to cultivate a pub-
lic image of generosity and kindness. When children observe
the batterer’s popularity in the community, they can become
more likely to blame their mother or themselves for the abuse
in the home, because other people do not seem to believe that
their father has a problem. Manipulation may also involve
lying to the children, or drawing them in as agents of the
abuse, as exhibited by Troy when he get his children to laugh
at inappropriate jokes about their mother. Children who are
traumatized by exposure to violent acts are at greater risk of
being psychologically harmed by such manipulation than chil-
dren who are less emotion-
ally vulnerable.
Possessiveness: Men
who batter commonly per-
ceive their partners as
owned objects,9 and this
outlook extends to their
children in many cases.
Many clients of mine have,
for example, defended
their physical or sexual
abuse of the children by
insisting that it is their
paternal prerogative to
treat their children as they
see fit. Batterers’ possessiveness toward both partners and
children can have important post-separation implications. For
example, batterers have been found to seek custody at higher
rates than non-battering fathers do,10 and to be at their great-
est risk of committing homicide of women or children during
and after the break-up of a relationship.11 Parents who per-
ceive children as possessions have been observed to have high
rates of child abuse in general,12 and the link between such
attitudes and incest perpetration is widely noted.13
This is a brief and partial review of the batterer profile. Each
of the characteristics commonly found in batterers, including
denial and minimization about their abusive and violent
actions, battering in multiple relationships, and high level of
resistance to change, can have an important impact on chil-
dren who are exposed to them.14
RISK OF CHILD ABUSE
The various published studies of physical abuse of children
by batterers indicate that roughly half of batterers repeatedly
assault children in the home, a rate about 700% that of non-
battering men.15 An equally substantial body of research finds
batterers four or more times more likely than other men to sex-
ually abuse their children or stepchildren. Exposure to domes-
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tic violence is one of the top
risk factors for incest victim-
ization.16 The literature on
incest perpetrators describes
a profile that is compatible
with battering, including a
high level of control, entitle-
ment, and manipulativeness,
and a tendency to view chil-
dren as owned objects.17
No evidence currently
exists to suggest that the risk of child abuse by a batterer
declines post-separation, and such risk may increase. Batterers
tend to be enraged and retaliatory for an extended period after
a relationship ends, contributing to volatility in their behavior,
and they sometimes increase their targeting of the children as
a way to frighten or upset the mother because the separation
causes a loss of access to avenues to abuse the mother
directly.18 The risk to children may also be augmented by the
fact that the battered mother is no longer able to monitor the
batterer’s treatment of the children during his times of contact
with them. Clinicians sometimes observe that courts are reluc-
tant to believe reports from battered women regarding mis-
treatment of their children during court-ordered visitation,
which can sometimes leave children vulnerable to ongoing
abuse by the batterer.
THE BATTERER’S PARENTING STYLE
Apart from the risk of overt child abuse, batterers often tend
toward authoritarian, neglectful, and verbally abusive
approaches to child-rearing.19 The effects on the children of
these parenting weaknesses may be intensified by their prior
traumatic experience of witnessing violence. For example,
children whose battering fathers yell or bark orders at them
appear to be more shaken by these experiences than children
who have not been exposed to violence, as they are aware of
his capacity for physical assault whether or not he has ever
assaulted them directly. My colleagues and I also often observe
that a batterer’s authoritarian or intimidating behaviors in the
children’s presence, or toward them directly, can cause trau-
matic memories to be reawakened in them, with resultant
increase in their symptoms and interference in their social and
intellectual development. Batterers have also been observed to
be manipulative of children, and to exhibit neglectful parent-
ing, including inadequate supervision of safety.20 Additional
crucial problems in the parenting of men who batter include
the use of the children as weapons against the mother and the
undermining of the mother’s authority, which are discussed
further below, with important post-separation implications.
THE BATTERER AS ROLE MODEL
Boys who are exposed to domestic violence show dramati-
cally elevated rates of battering their own partners as adoles-
cents or adults.21 Research suggests that this connection is a
product largely of the values and attitudes that boys learn
from witnessing battering behavior.22 Daughters of battered
women show increased difficulty in escaping partner abuse in
their adult relationships.23 Both boys and girls have been
observed to accept various aspects of the batterer’s belief sys-
tem,24 including the view that victims of violence are to
blame, that women exaggerate hysterically when they report
abuse, that males are superior to females, and that the use of
violence against women by men is justifiable.25 Donna and
Troy’s son, Marty, exhibits, for example, his absorption of his
father’s negative and degrading attitudes toward females,
which he acts out toward his sister, Rhonda, and toward his
mother. 
The destructive influence that batterers can have on chil-
dren’s belief systems, and therefore on their future behavior,
has not received adequate attention in most professional pub-
lications, and appears to be largely overlooked in crafting cus-
tody and visitation determinations. Children who are trauma-
tized may be particularly easy to influence because of their ele-
vated needs for belonging, security, and self-esteem. Therefore,
decisions to place children in unsupervised contact with a bat-
terer should be made with great care.
UNDERMINING OF THE MOTHER’S AUTHORITY
Battering is inherently destructive to maternal authority. As
we saw with Troy in the opening scenario, the batterer’s behav-
ior provides a model for children of contemptuous and aggres-
sive behavior toward their mother. The predictable result, con-
firmed by many studies, is that children of battered women
have increased rates of violence and disobedience toward their
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mothers.26 These inherent effects are aggravated in many cases
by the batterer’s deliberate weakening of the mother’s ability to
set limits, which may be accompanied by violence toward her
regarding issues about the children.27 We saw Troy, for exam-
ple, give explicit approval to his son’s disrespectful language
toward Donna. Troy is able in this way to enhance his own
power in the family and ensure that his wife will appear to be
an ineffective or volatile parent. Troy then goes on to assault
Donna to retaliate against her for her efforts to stand up for
herself and for her daughter.
IMPACT ON FAMILY DYNAMICS
Many other behaviors that are commonly observed in bat-
terers can distort family functioning. Some common examples
include:
Interfering with a mother’s parenting. Partners of my battering
clients make frequent reports of being prevented from picking
up a crying infant or from assisting a frightened or injured
child, of being barred from providing other basic physical or
emotional care, and even of being forbidden to take children to
medical appointments. Interference of this kind can cause the
children to perceive their mother as uncaring or unreliable,
feelings the batterer may reinforce by verbally conditioning the
children through statements such as, “Your mother doesn’t
love you” or “Mommy only cares about herself.” The trauma
caused to the mother by domestic violence can also sometimes
make it more difficult to be fully present and attentive for her
children,28 which the batterer may then use to his advantage in
a custody or visitation dispute.
Sowing divisions within the family. In our opening scenario,
Troy uses favoritism to build a special relationship with one of
his children (Marty), demonstrating a dynamic that occurs fre-
quently in the parenting of men who batter. As other
researchers have noted, the favored child is particularly likely
to be a boy, and the batterer may bond with him partly through
encouraging a sense of superiority to females.29 Batterers may
also sow divisions by deliberately creating or feeding familial
tensions. These behaviors are a likely factor in the high rate of
intersibling conflict, including violence, observed in families
exposed to battering behavior.30 Descriptions of division-sow-
ing behaviors in incest perpetrators31 are remarkably similar to
clinical observations of these behaviors in men who batter.32
Use of the children as weapons. Many batterers use children
as a vehicle to harm or control the mother,33 through such tac-
tics as destroying the chil-
dren’s belongings to punish
the mother, requiring the
children to monitor and
report on their mother’s activ-
ities, or threatening to kidnap
or take custody of the chil-
dren if the mother attempts to
end the relationship. These
behaviors draw the children
into the abuser’s behavior pat-
tern. Post-separation, many
batterers use unsupervised
visitation as an opportunity to
abuse the mother through the children by alienating them
from the mother, encouraging them to behave in destructive or
defiant ways when they return home, or returning them dirty,
unfed, or sleep-deprived from visitation.34 These important
dynamics rarely appear to be taken into account in crafting
custody and visitation plans.
Retaliation for the mother’s efforts to protect the children. A
mother may find that she is assaulted or intimidated if she
attempts to prevent the batterer from mistreating the children,
or may find that he harms the children more seriously to pun-
ish her for standing up for them, and therefore may be forced
over time to stop intervening on her children’s behalf.35 In our
opening scenario, Troy’s assault on Donna was a direct result of
her efforts to protect her daughter from psychological harm,
and may have the effect of intimidating her the next time she
would like to protect her children from him. This dynamic can
lead children to believe that their mother doesn’t care about
the ways in which the batterer is hurting them, because she
sometimes maintains a frightened silence in the face of his
behavior. This perception in children can be exacerbated in
cases where a court requires a battered woman to send her chil-
dren to visitation with their father despite their objections. It
therefore becomes critically important for children who have
been exposed to domestic violence not to be required to see or
speak with the perpetrator when they are voicing or demon-
strating a preference not to do so.
POST-SEPARATION IMPLICATIONS
Custody and visitation determinations in the context of
domestic violence need to be informed by an awareness of the
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36. The great majority of children who live with a batterer directly see
or hear one or more acts of violence. See J. Kolbo, et al., Children
Who Witness Domestic Violence: A Review of Empirical Literature,
11 JOURNAL OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 281, 281-293 (1996).
There have also been a substantial number who have witnessed
sexual assaults against their mother: See Janis Wolak & David
Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence, in PARTNER
VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF RESEARCH at
73-111 (Jana Jasinksi & Linda M. Williams, eds., 1998).
37. See Sheryl Heller, et al., Research on Resilience to Child
Maltreatment: Empirical Considerations, 23 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 321, 321-338 (1998); Sandra Graham-Bermann, The
Impact of Woman Abuse on Children’s Social Development: Research
and Theoretical Perspectives, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL
VIOLENCE: THEORY, RESEARCH & APPLIED ISSUES, at 21-54 (George
Holden, et al., eds., 1998).
38. See Bessell A. van der Kolk & Alexander C. McFarlane, The Black
Hole of Trauma, in TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF
OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY & SOCIETY at 3-23
(Bessell A. van der Kolk, et al., eds., 1996). 
39. Note that both children and adults can become strongly bonded
in an unhealthy way to a perpetrator of abuse through a process
known as traumatic bonding.  See Donald Dutton, & Susan
Painter, Traumatic Bonding: The Development of Emotional
Attachments in Battered Women and Other Relationships of
Intermittent Abuse, 6 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
139, 139-155 (1983). See also Donald Dutton, & Susan Painter,
The Battered Woman Syndrome: Effects of Severity and Intermittency
of Abuse, 63 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 614, 614-622
(1993); BEVERLY JAMES, HANDBOOK FOR TREATMENT OF ATTACHMENT-
TRAUMA PROBLEMS IN CHILDREN (1994). I have observed that eval-
uators who assess the strength of children’s bonds with their bat-
tering fathers rarely address the role of traumatic bonding.
40. A detailed guide to performing proper custody and visitation eval-
uations in the context of domestic violence allegations is avail-
able. See BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 8.
41. It should be noted that batterer programs that are run on a
“power-and-control” model have been found to be more effective
than was previously believed, especially if any attendant drug and
alcohol issues are also properly addressed.  See EDWARD W.
GONDOLF, BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS (2001). 
destructive parenting
behaviors exhibited by
many batterers, and in par-
ticular the ways in which
these behaviors may dam-
age or eliminate the poten-
tial for children to heal psy-
chologically and socially
from the traumatic experi-
ences they have endured.
Exposure to a batterer’s
inappropriate parenting has
especially important impli-
cations for children who
are struggling with two sets
of psychological injuries,
one from previous witnessing of domestic violence and the
other from their parents’ divorce.36
In evaluating custody and visitation and crafting appropri-
ate parenting plans, the following elements require close exam-
ination:
The children’s healing needs. There is a wide consensus that
children’s recovery from exposure to domestic violence and
from divorce depends largely on the quality of their relation-
ship with the non-battering parent and with their siblings.37
Therefore, visitation plans should take into account whether
the batterer is likely, based on his past and current behavior, to
continue (or begin) to undermine the mother’s authority, inter-
fere with mother-child relationships, or cause tension between
siblings, all of which can interfere significantly with children’s
healing. Children also need a sense of safety in order to heal
well,38 which may not be fostered by leaving them in the unsu-
pervised care of a man whose violent tendencies they have wit-
nessed, even if they feel a strong bond of affection for him.39
The need for detailed assessment. A batterer’s history of par-
enting behaviors must be investigated carefully, to assess the
presence of any of the common problems described above,
with particular attention to the risk that he may use children
as a vehicle for continued abuse of the mother. Such assess-
ment cannot be properly performed through reliance on clini-
cal evaluation of the father, mother, or children. It must
involve extensive collecting of evidence from other sources of
information, such as school personnel, witnesses to important
events, police and medical reports, child protective records,
telephone and mail communications, and other sources.
Courts must also ensure that custody evaluators have exten-
sive training on the multiple sources of risk to children from
unsupervised contact with batterers, such as the ones dis-
cussed above.40
Safely fostering father-child relationships. Except in cases
where a batterer has been terrifyingly violent or threatening to
the mother in the presence of the children, or has abused the
children directly in a severe and repeated form, it is common
for children to request some degree of ongoing contact with
their battering fathers. In many cases, they may benefit from
such contact as long as safety measures are provided, the con-
tact is not overly extensive, and the abuser is not permitted to
cause setbacks to the children’s healing process. 
One way to foster these goals is to increase the use of pro-
fessionally supervised visitation, ideally based in a visitation
center. Any future transition to unsupervised visitation should
not be treated as assumed or automatic, but should instead be
conditioned on the batterer completing a high-quality batterer
intervention program, dealing seriously with any substance
abuse issues he has, and showing other indications of being
serious about changing his abusive behavior and accepting
responsibility for his past actions.41
Where careful assessment leads to the conclusion that unsu-
pervised visitation is physically and emotionally safe for the
children, visits that are kept relatively short in duration and
that do not include overnight stays can help to reduce the bat-
terer’s ability to damage children’s critical healing relationship
with their mother. Such restricted contact can allow the chil-
dren to meet their need to have an ongoing bond with their
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father and to share key life events, while simultaneously limit-
ing his influence as a destructive role model, which, as already
noted here, has been shown to put them at very high risk for
future involvement in domestic violence  A plan of this kind
also helps to ensure that children feel securely and safely
attached to their primary home, and to feel that the court sys-
tem is empowering their mother to protect them, elements that
are indispensable to recovery of traumatized children.
CONCLUSION
Children who are exposed to domestic violence have multi-
ple potential sources of emotional and physical injury from the
batterer’s behavior, well beyond the witnessing of assaults
alone; their potential for recovery from past domestic violence
can be compromised by ongoing unsupervised contact with
their father. Additionally, children are at risk to develop
destructive attitudes and values that can contribute to behav-
ioral and developmental problems. Abused mothers face many
obstacles in attempting to protect their children from a bat-
terer, and can benefit when their protective efforts receive
strong support from courts and child protective services.
Family and juvenile court personnel, as well as those working
in child protection agencies, can strengthen the quality of their
interventions on behalf of children by deepening their under-
standing of the common patterns that may appear in the par-
enting of men who batter, including ways in which a batterer
may damage mother-child and sibling relationships and make
it difficult for a mother to parent her children. Courts can
increase their effectiveness in domestic violence cases involv-
ing children by focusing on maternal and child safety, and by
seeking ways to reduce the batterer’s influence as a role model,
particularly for his sons.
Lundy Bancroft is the author of The Batterer as
Parent: Addressing the Impact of Domestic
Violence on Family Dynamics. His latest book
is Why Does He Do That?: Inside the Minds
of Angry and Controlling Men. He is a batterer
intervention specialist and a guardian ad litem.
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PETER JAFFE, NANCY LEMON & SAMANTHA
POISSON, CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY. Sage Publishing, 2002
($29.95).  194 pp.
This new book by renowned authors and
researchers focuses on the complexity of
the challenges facing judges, lawyers, leg-
islators, and mental health professionals
in developing safe and effective strategies
for resolving custody disputes. The
authors outline the essential differences
between custody disputes with and with-
out allegations and findings of domestic
violence, and the different analysis and
distinct interventions by judges, policy-
makers, and mental health professionals
necessary in domestic violence cases. The
volume also addresses difficult issues
such as parent alienation syndrome, false
allegations, and mutual abuse.  The
authors offer recommendations for leg-
islative improvements, increased training
for legal and mental health professionals,
enhanced services and programs, and the
development of new policies to deal with
domestic violence in custody disputes.
JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE
COURTROOM:  THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES. Northeastern University
Press, 1999 ($50 hard cover, $20 paper-
back).  224 pp.
Sociology professor James Ptacek studied
domestic violence restraining order prac-
tices in two Massachusetts courts, and
examined the role of judges and the court
system (including clerks and other court
officers and agents) in the process of
obtaining restraining orders.  Ptacek’s
analysis focuses on the history of the law
related to domestic violence, the effect of
domestic violence on women’s lives, and
the courtroom negotiations between
women and judges in restraining order
hearings.  Ptacek identifies a number of
judicial responses that can help assure
battered women’s safety.
LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE
BATTERER AS PARENT:  ADDRESSING THE
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY
DYNAMICS. Sage Publishing, 2002
($32.95).  256 pp.  
Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman rely on
their extensive experience counseling
men who batter to identify how abusive
and controlling behaviors can affect the
atmosphere in the home.  Direct and
indirect impacts of domestic abuse on the
children in the home are discussed, and
checklists of solutions for courts, evalua-
tors, judges, criminal justice personnel
and other professionals who work with
domestic violence victims and perpetra-
tors are included.  Judges and other pro-
fessionals dealing with domestic violence
cases can develop action plans for evalu-
ating how they respond to domestic vio-
lence custody cases based on the infor-
mation in this book.  (For an overview of
themes explored in greater detail in this
book, read Bancroft’s article at page 44 of
this issue.)
o 
WEB RESOURCES
American Bar Association
Commission on Domestic Violence
h t t p : / / w w w. a b a n e t . o rg / d o m v i o l /
home.html
This is the home page for the ABA
Commission on Domestic Violence.  The
site provides information for attorneys,
judges, and other professionals who work
with the judicial system on issues of
domestic violence.  Included are several
public education brochures, including
Why Abuse Victims Stay, Know Your
Rights: Domestic Violence, and Domestic
Violence: Safety Tips for You and Your
Family.  Some of the brochures are avail-
able in both English and Spanish.
United States Justice Department
Office on Violence Against Women
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo  
This is the home page for the U.S. Justice
Department’s Office on Violence Against
Women.  The site provides links to infor-
mation, including the most recent statis-
tical information on violence against
women, including domestic violence and
sexual assault.  The site includes a sec-
tion identifying model programs for com-
bating domestic violence, information on
federal grant programs, and a 16-chapter
“toolkit” to end violence against women.
Family Violence Prevention Fund
http://www.endabuse.org/programs/
justice
The Family Violence Prevention Fund
offers training and information for judges
who work with all aspects of family vio-
lence.  The website offers information
about upcoming trainings, and includes
resource information for judges who
want to know more about judicial solu-
tions to the problem of family violence.
Minnesota Center Against Violence
and Abuse (MINCAVA)
http://www.mincava.umn.edu     
MINCAVA, the Minnesota Center Against
Violence and Abuse located at the
University of Minnesota, offers an exten-
sive and nationally relevant resource of
information, statistical research, and arti-
cles related to violence.  MINCAVA pro-
vides information about domestic vio-
lence and child abuse, along with all
other types of violence in our society.  
National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges
http://www.ncjfcj.unr.edu   
The National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges maintains a website
providing information and links to civil,
family, and criminal state laws related to
domestic violence for every state and the
District of Columbia.  The National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges also can provide information to
judges about domestic violence issues,
full faith and credit for protective orders,
and firearms and domestic violence.
Their resource center on domestic vio-
lence can be reached at 1-800-527-3223.
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National Center for State Courts
http://www.ncsconline.org
The National Center for State Courts has
a number of resources online.  A recent
search of its website for “domestic vio-
lence” turned up 200 entries, including a
detailed Family Violence Resource Guide.
Also included is the publication Family
Violence Forum, which provides regular
updates about approaches taken by vari-
ous courts in combating family violence.   
American Judges Association
h t t p : / / a j a . n c s c . d n i . u s / d o m v i o l /
booklet.html
The American Judges Association and
American Judges Foundation have pub-
lished an introductory booklet for judges
handling domestic violence cases.  It pro-
vides a useful overview of the literature in
the area and the steps judges can take in
appropriately handling cases involving
allegations of domestic violence.
PRIOR COURT REVIEW ARTICLES
Julie Kunce Field, Visits in Cases Marked
by Violence: Judicial Actions That Can Help
Keep Children and Victims Safe, COURT
REVIEW, Fall 1998, at 23 (available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr35-3/
CR35-3KunceField.pdf).  
Randal B. Fritzler & Lenore M.J. Simon,
Creating a Domestic Violence Court:
Combat in the Trenches, COURT REVIEW,
Spring 2000, at 28 (available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr37/
cr37-1/CR9FritzlerSimon.pdf).
Merrilyn McDonald, The Myth of
Epidemic False Allegations of Sexual Abuse
in Divorce Cases, COURT REVIEW, Spring
1998, at 12 (available at http://aja.ncsc.
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NEW REPORTS
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 2002
REPORT ON TRENDS IN THE STATE COURTS
(2002).  99 pp.
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_KIS/Trends/
Trends02MainPage.html
Each year, the National Center for State
Courts produces a report on trends in
state courts.  These reports attempt to
identify key areas, to report the latest
developments, and to forecast potential
future ones.  
This year’s report includes a separate,
43-page “environmental scan” produced
jointly by the National Center and
Futurist.com under a grant from the State
Justice Institute.  For anyone involved in
court planning or interested in where
things may go in the future, this environ-
mental scan—along with the rest of this
trends report—would be an excellent
starting point.
The environmental scan attempts to
identify events, trends, or other factors
that will shape the future.  These
researchers sought to provide background
that would let courts and court-related
organizations evaluate their long-term
programs and potential against the vari-
ous conditions—internal and external—
that may affect courts in the coming years.
Areas in which trends are surveyed
include population demographics, cul-
ture, budget, technology, and ethics, as
well as several court-specific categories,
such as criminal justice, civil justice, and
juvenile justice.
In addition to the broad overview pro-
vided by the environmental scan, the
trends report also includes short (3- to 5-
page) essays describing trends in specific
areas.  Topics include dealing with present
budget woes, handling death penalty
cases, the paperless law practice, teen
courts, and public access to private data
found in court files.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES (AS OF
OCTOBER 2002).  12 pp.
h t t p : / / w w w. n c s c o n l i n e . o rg / W C /
Publications/KIS_JudComJudSal1002Pub
.pdf
The National Center for State Courts
has published an annual survey of state
judicial salaries for more than 20 years.
While judicial compensation is always of
interest, this year’s edition contains some
new features that make it especially note-
worthy.  First, in addition to the tradi-
tional rankings of judicial salaries by state,
a separate comparison is provided this
year for trial judge salaries taking into
account a cost-of-living adjustment for
each state.  Second, an analysis is provided
of judicial salary increases over the past 10
years as compared to the rate of inflation.
The cost-of-living-adjusted salary data
will be of interest to many.  For example,
although superior court judges in the
District of Columbia receive a salary of
$150,000, it amounts to only $114,000,
once adjusted.  An even larger difference
exists for New Jersey superior court
judges, whose actual salary of $141,000 is
adjusted to $98,000.  By comparison, the
$108,000 salary of a Missouri circuit court
judge, once adjusted, amounts to
$116,000.  The comparison certainly sug-
gests that the District of Columbia and
New Jersey judges are not doing as well as
the mere salary data might indicate.
The salary data adjusted by cost of liv-
ing is only as good as the index used,
however, and there may not be sufficient
reliable data available.  To make the cost-
of-living adjustment, the National
Center’s staff has used the ACCRA cost-of-
living index.  ACCRA is a non-profit orga-
nization formerly known as the American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers
Association (and now found on the web at
www.accra.org).  It still relies for its data
on local chambers of commerce or other
economic development organizations that
choose to participate in the program,
making the data neither randomly
selected nor chosen in some other scien-
tifically prescribed manner.   It now
includes only cities with populations
above 50,000.  Three states—Maine, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island—have no
participating chambers or other
researchers, so that no cost-of-living data
is available from ACCRA for them.  Thus,
while the cost-of-living-adjusted salary
data is of interest, its accuracy is lessened
by these underlying problems with the
ACCRA data.  
The comparison of salary increases
over the decade from 1991 to 2001
showed that judicial salaries actually ran
slightly ahead of inflation, based on
increases during the last half of that
period.  We suspect that this small gain
will be eroded by the budget problems
most states have experienced during 2002
and 2003.
o 
WEBSITES OF INTEREST
Online Course for Judges
on Handling Mass Tort Cases
http: / /www.ncsconline.org/D_ICM/
DistLrnBlkBd.htm
The National Center for State Courts
has created and posted an online educa-
tional course for judges handling mass
tort cases.  The online course is intended
for use by state or federal judges.  enroll-
ment is easy and the course material is
easily accessible.  The course was created
under a State Justice Institute grant in col-
laboration with the Conference of Chief
Justices.
e
FOCUS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The Resource Page focuses on resources
that can help judges handle cases involv-
ing domestic violence on pages 50-51.
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